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ABSTRACT
The author examines the influence o f precedent on Supreme Court decision-making in
Canada. Despite its importance, very little is actually known about the factors that affect
judicial decision-making. The thesis begins by defining the doctrine of precedent,
discusses the virtues o f adhering to a policy of precedent, and provides a brief historical
overview o f the history o f precedent in Canadian law. The author then reviews the three
leading paradigms in judicial behavioural research as they relate to the influence o f
precedent. The legal model expects precedent to be among the most important factors that
judges consider when making decisions. In contrast, the attitudinal model believes that
judicial decisions are conditioned by the attitudes and preferences of the judges. The
strategic model expects precedent to have some influence on judicial decision-making, in
addition to other considerations. Based on the findings of previous research and the
Court’s jurisprudence, the author hypothesizes that, although judges frequently cite
precedents to justify their decisions, it rarely influences how they decide cases. To test
this, three separate studies are conducted. The first is a content analysis of the Court’s
judgments from 2004; the second study, which is based on the work of Brenner and
Spaeth, examines o f the influence o f precedent in decisions that alter precedent; the third
study applies the methodology developed by Segal and Spaeth to assess the influence of
precedent in all cases decided since 1950. The results show, inter alia, that the majority
o f Justices on the Supreme Court of Canada decide cases based on attitudinal factors, and
that precedent has a minimal influence on their decision-making.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
For the past decade Canadian legal scholars and political scientists have engaged in
an intense debate over the extent to which Supreme Court decisions and Justices are
“activist.” The term “judicial activism” is difficult to define with precision; however, it is
usually used to describe judgments wherein the Court invalidates laws passed by
democratically elected representatives, or when the Justices are perceived to be deciding
cases according to their personal preferences.1Although the “activism” debate is not new in
Canada, it re-emerged in the mid-1980s in large part because the introduction of the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms significantly expanded the power of the judiciary to influence public
policy. In an interview with the Globe and Mail early in 2005, Chief Justice Beverley
McLachlin dismissed claims that the Court is “activist,” arguing that commentators use the
term “activism” to “mask their personal distaste for a particular judgment.”2 In her opinion,
the public is “coming to a better understanding of the shallowness” of the entire question of
“judicial activism.”3
Whether or not one agrees with the Chief Justice, it does seem clear that it is time to
move beyond the “judicial activism” debate, or at the very least, to redefine its terms. The
debate over “judicial activism” should be put to rest primarily because it has proven
academically unfruitful.4 Judicial activism does not offer a methodology that can be used to
gain insights into judicial decisions. Instead it is a line of criticism that is inextricably tied to
politics, evidenced by the fact that claims of judicial activism come almost exclusively from
1 See generally, Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue
(Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2001); Sujit Choudhry and Claire Hunter, “Measuring Judicial Activism on the
Supreme Court of Canada: A Comment on Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. NAPE,” McGill Law
Journal 48 (2002): 525 - 560.
2 Kirk Makin, “Judicial activism debate on decline, top judge says,” The Globe and Mail. 8 Jan., 2005, A l.
3 Ibid.
4 Choudhry and Hunter, 530.
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“right-wing” commentators.5 Rather than studying the implications of judicial decisions or
the characteristics of Charter litigants, which have been the “dominant” focus of political
science literature in Canada, scholars need to examine the factors that influence the decision
making behaviour of judges.
The doctrine of precedent, which holds that judges must follow previous judicial
decisions, is widely regarded as the “fundamental principle on which judicial decision
making is supposed to rest.”6 Yet, despite its importance, precedent has received very little
attention from Canadian academics in the last fifty years. In contrast, American scholars have
debated the efficacy and operation of the doctrine of precedent at length.7 Furthermore, the
U.S. media regularly discuss precedent when there is a vacancy on the Supreme Court. For
example, the media coverage surrounding John Roberts’ nomination as Chief Justice has
focused considerably on Roberts’ view of precedent as it applies to controversial decisions
such as Roe v. Wade.8
Except for a few scattered law review articles, precedent is rarely discussed by
Canadian scholars or journalists. Perhaps more importantly, so much academic energy has
been devoted to the “activism” debate, that there has been no attempt (that this author is
aware of) to empirically assess the influence of precedent on the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Canada. This is surprising because American researchers have developed

5 See Neil Seeman, “Taking Judicial Activism Seriously,” Fraser Forum (August 2003): 3 -19.
6 Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, “The Influence of Stare Decisis on the Votes o f United States
Supreme Court Justices,” American Journal of Political Science 40, no. 2 (1996): 971.
7 Michael Stokes Paulsen, “Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential
Effect of Roe and Casey?” Yale Law Journal 109 (2000): 1535 - 1602.
8 Maura Reynolds and Richard Schmitt, ‘ Roberts is Confronted on Abortion,” Los Angeles Times 14 Sept.
2005 [online newspaper]; accessed 17 Sept. 2005; available from
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-robertsl4sepl4,0,3591108,Ml.story?coll=la-homeheadlines; Jeffrey Smith and Jo Becker, “Sifting Old, New Writings For Roberts’s Philosophy,”
Washington Post 21 Aug. 2005 [online newspaper]; accessed 23 Aug. 2005; available from
http://www.washingtonpost.com/vyp-dyn/content/articIe/2005/08/20/AR2005082001325jpf.html.
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sophisticated methodologies which make it possible to scientifically examine the influence of
precedent.
Studying the influence of precedent on the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada
is important for a number of reasons. Foremost among them is to test the conventional
wisdom that precedent is the “fundamental principle” of judicial decision-making.9 Just
because lawyers, judges, and the general public assume that precedent is important does not
necessarily make it so. Such a bold assertion should be capable of substantiation through the
use of replicable methodologies.
Whether, and to what extent, precedent influences judicial decision-making has
serious implications for how the law is taught. For centuries, the study of law has emphasized
the centrality of legal rules and doctrines, without actually testing to determine if they really
matter when judges make decisions. As Marc Gold explains, “The study of law in Canada
remains, to a large degree, the study of judicial opinions.”10 While judicial opinions are
certainly an important part of a legal education, more emphasis needs to be placed on the
behaviour of judges, rather than just examining what they say in their judgments.
The present analysis combines various methodologies to provide a comprehensive
and multidimensional examination of the influence of precedent on the decisions of the
Supreme Court of Canada. It begins by defining precedent and explaining how judges use
previous decisions in their judgments. The virtues of adhering to a policy of precedent are
then appraised, followed by a brief historical overview of the evolution of the Supreme Court
of Canada’s approach to precedent. Chapter Two reviews the academic literature relating to
judicial decision-making generally, and to the influence of precedent in particular. It

9 Segal and Spaeth, 971; See William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1. (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1979), 69.
10 Marc Gold, “The Mask of Objectivity: Politics and Rhetoric in the Supreme Court of Canada.” Supreme
Court Law Review 7, no. 2 (1985): 455.
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discusses the leading theoretical paradigms injudicial behavioural scholarship, and their
applicability to the Supreme Court of Canada.
Based on the findings of previous research and the Court’s jurisprudence, I
hypothesize that, notwithstanding what the Justices say in their opinions, precedent rarely
influences their decisions. To test this hypothesis, the research employs a content analysis of
the Court’s judgments, and applies the methodologies developed by American researchers to
measure the influence of precedent on the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court to the
judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada sincel950.
Chapter Three provides a detailed explanation of the procedures used to collect,
classify, and analyze the data. Chapter Four presents the results and addresses the
implications of the findings. Finally, Chapter Five concludes the analysis by discussing the
need for addition research into the decision-making of the Supreme Court of Canada.
1. Precedent: Definition and Operationalization
At its most basic level, precedent requires judges in common law legal systems to
respect the prior decisions of coordinate or superior courts. It derives from the ancient Latin
maxim “stare decisis et non quieta movere,” meaning to “stand by the thing decided, and not
to disturb settled points.”11 Black’s Law Dictionary defines stare decisis as, “the doctrine of
precedent, under which it is necessary for a court to follow earlier judicial decisions when the
same points arise again in litigation.”12 The ensuing analysis uses both “precedent” and
“stare decisis” to describe the judicial practice of adhering to previous decisions.
The doctrine of precedent appears to have its origins in 12th century England, during
the reign of King Henry n. Shortly after the signing of the Magna Carta, the King appointed
a group of judges who traveled across the English countryside adjudicating disputes
11 James Rehnquist, “The Power that Shall be Vested in a Precedent: Stare Decisis, the Constitution and the
Supreme Court,” Boston University Law Review 66 (1986): 347.
12 Black’s Law Dictionary, s.v. “stare decisis.”
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according to the existing customs and traditions of the people.13 Over time, these judges
began to keep informal reports of their judgments that they and other judges consulted in
future cases. This rudimentary reporting system is significant because it allowed judges to
render similar decisions in analogous cases. The practice of following the decisions of other
judges grew from the absence of a written code in England and the corresponding need to
create a uniform system of laws that were common throughout the whole Kingdom.14
Although it is unclear precisely when the “modem” doctrine of stare decisis became
established as a judicial policy, it appears to have been during the eighteenth century.
Moreover, there is substantial agreement among scholars that, in order to develop properly,
the practice of following precedent requires the creation of an official system of reporting
judicial decisions.15 According to Lewis, “wherever judicial decisions are systematically
reported their authority tends to increase.”16 Similarly, in her book, The Majesty of the Law.
retiring U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor emphasizes the importance of
reporting judicial decisions by devoting an entire chapter to the history of the Supreme Court
Reports.17 Thus, the common law developed on a case-by-case basis, with judges applying
and expanding rules contained in reports of previous judicial decisions.
The eminent American legal scholar Roscoe Pound described precedent as the
distinguishing feature of the “common law technique” of judicial decision-making, which
conceives of law “as experience developed by reason and reason tested and developed by
experience.”18 According to Pound, “it is a technique of finding the grounds of decision in

13 T. Ellis Lewis, “The History of Judicial Precedent,” Law Quarterly Review 182 (1930): 208.
14 R. C. Van Caenegem, The Birth o f the English Common Law. 2ndEdition (New York. Cambridge
University Press, 1988), 89 - 90.
15 Frederick Kempin Jr., “Precedent and Stare Decisis: The Critical Years, 1800 to 1850,” American
Journal of Legal History 3 (1959): 31.
16 Lewis, 215.
17 Sandra Day O’Connor. The Majesty of the Law: Reflections of a Supreme Court Justice (New York:
Random House, 2004), see Chapter 4 at 24.
18 Roscoe Pound, “What of Stare Decisis?” Fordham Law Review 10, no. 1 (1941): 5.
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recorded judicial experience... ”19 Thus, past judicial decisions carry authority in that they
serve to justify subsequent decisions in similar cases. As a heuristic device, precedent is not
unique to the decision making of judges; individuals regularly consult past experiences when
making present decisions. However, unlike most people, judges are institutionally required to
follow their own prior decisions and those of other judges.
Under the doctrine of precedent, courts are bound to follow their own previous
decisions as well as the decisions of superior courts in their jurisdiction. Specifically, judges
are required to follow the ra tio decidendi, which means the “reason for deciding,” contained
within previous judgments.20 Professor Goodhart explains that in order to determine the ra tio
d eciden di

of a judgment, one must identify “the material facts as seen by the judge and his

conclusion based on them.”21 The material facts of a case are those which the judge feels are
the most relevant to die disposition of the case.22 When the material facts of a precedent case
are “identical” to those in a subsequent case, judges are bound to apply the ratio from the
first case.
In contrast, extraneous judicial statements that are unnecessary to a decision are
considered o b iter dicta, which means literally “words in passing.”23 In their opinions judges
often speculate as to how the case would have resulted had certain facts been different. These
types of statements are an example of o b iter dicta. They are persuasive, but unlike the ratio,
statements made in o b ite r do not bind lower courts. It should be noted that determining the
ra tio

and o b ite r of a particular judgment is not an exact science, evidenced by the fact that

judges frequently disagree with their colleagues as to which rules are binding and which are
not.
19 Ibid.
20 Rupert Cross. Precedent in English Law 2ndEdition (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 35.
21 Arthur Goodhart, “Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case,” Yale Law Journal 40, no. 2 (1930): 169.
22 Ibid.
23 Cross, 80.
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Moreover, a judge can “distinguish” a precedent if he or she feels that the prior case
is inapplicable because it differs in some materially relevant aspect from the case presently
under consideration. In some instances, judges will distinguish cases to avoid applying
precedents which they do not agree with.24 The most significant departure from the doctrine
of precedent occurs when a judge or court overrules a prior decision. Overruling a decision
differs from distinguishing, in that the latter retains its precedential force while overruled
decisions do not.
2. The Virtues of Stare Decisis
Following precedent is, in effect, a self-enforcing policy norm, meaning that it is not
prescribed by any “positive” source of law such as a statute or constitution.25 Nevertheless,
legal scholars and members of the judiciary have long maintained that adherence to precedent
promotes important values associated with the rule of law, including fairness, stability and
predictability. For these reasons, the doctrine of precedent is described by the legal academy
as an essential part of judicial decision-making in a common law system.
According to its supporters, stare decisis promotes fairness by ensuring that like
cases will be treated alike. For a legal system to be considered fair, individuals in similar
circumstances must be subject to the same legal consequences.26 As former U.S. Supreme
Court Justice William Douglas stated, “there will be no equal justice under law if a
negligence rule is applied in the morning but not in the afternoon.”27 Furthermore, stare
decisis promotes fairness by limiting judicial discretion. The Framers of the U.S. Constitution
believed that the doctrine of precedent was one way to limit the discretion of the federal

24 See Cross, 48.
25 There has been some debate, primarily in the U.S., as to whether the judiciary is required to follow
precedent. See John Harrison, “The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent,” Duke Law Journal 50
(2000) 503 - 543.
26 Rehnquist, 347. Also see, “Constitutional Stare Decisis,” Harvard Law Review 103 (1990): 1349.
27 William O. Douglas, “Stare Decisis,” Columbia Law Review 49 (1949): 736.
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judiciary. As Alexander Hamilton stated in The Federalist No. 78, “to avoid an arbitrary
discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and
precedents... ”28 From this perspective, following precedent ensures that the outcomes of
legal disputes depend on legal considerations and not on the personalities and proclivities of
individual judges.
Commentators also argue that precedent imparts stability to the legal system by
preventing dramatic changes in legal rules or doctrines. In Justice Douglas’s words, “stare
decisis serves to take the capricious element out of law and to give stability to society.”29
Similarly, Monaghan contends that adherence to precedent promotes “system-wide stability”
by ensuring the survival of important governmental norms.30 While these norms may evolve
over time, stare decisis prevents the judiciary from radically altering their content. Thus,
stare decisis fosters stability, which, in turn, increases the public’s confidence in the law.
Furthermore, following prior judicial decisions provides predictability and continuity
to the legal system. Former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter maintained that
predictability is “rooted in the psychological need to satisfy reasonable expectations.”31 It is
fundamental to the rule of law that people be able to predict the legal consequences of their
actions. As Justice Anglin of the Supreme Court of Canada stated in a 1909 decision, “it is of
supreme importance that people may know with certainty what the law is, and this end can
only be attained by loyal adherence to that doctrine of stare decisis,”32 Moreover, the utility
of transactions such as wills and contracts depends upon the ability of individuals to predict

28 Alexander Hamilton, “The Federalist No. 78,” in Terrence Ball, The Federalist (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003), 383.
29 Douglas, 736.
30 Henry Paul Monaghan, “Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication,” Columbia Law Review 88
(1988): 723.
31 Helvering v. Hallock, [1940] 309 U.S. 106, 119.
32 Stuart v. Bank of Montreal, [1909] 41 S.C.R. 516 at 549.
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the applicable legal rules.33 Hence, maintaining the continuity of the law through adherence
to precedent enables people to arrange their future affairs with certainty.
In addition to rule of law considerations, commentators have argued that adherence to
precedent serves a number of practical purposes related to the efficient administration of the
legal system. For example, economically oriented scholars assert that application of stare
decisis limits a court’s agenda, thereby conserving scarce judicial decision-making
resources.34 As Justice Cardozo observed, “the labor of judges would be increased almost to
the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every case... ”35 By preventing
the constant reconsideration of settled legal questions, precedent economizes adjudicative
resources, thereby allowing courts to resolve more cases.36
Another practical benefit of following stare decisis is, according to some scholars,
that it improves decision-making. Specifically, Lee and others argue that adherence to
precedent improves the quality of judicial decision-making because judges can draw from the
accumulated experience and expertise of other judges.37 As Judge Easterbrook notes,
“subjecting each judge’s work to the test of congruence with the conclusions of those
confronting the same problem... increases... the chance of the court’s being right.”38
Accordingly, adherence to precedent has the potential to improve judicial decision-making
and reduce the number of erroneous judgments.

33 Rehnquist, 348.
34 Lews Komhauser, “An Economic Perspective on Stare Decisis,” Chicaao-Kent Law Review 65 (1989).
77.
35 Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921), 149.
36 Thomas R. Lee, “Stare Decisis in Economic Perspective: An Economic Analysis of the Supreme Court’s
Doctrine of Precedent,” North Carolina Law Review 78 (2000): 648.
37 Lee, 652; “Constitutional Stare Decisis,” 1349.
38 Frank Easterbrook, “Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions,” Cornell Law Review 73 (1988): 423.
Quoted by Lee at 652.
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3. The History of Stare Decisis in Canada
As a colony of the British Empire, Canada inherited many traditions of the common
law, including the practice of following precedent. In fact, precedent has been an important
feature of the Canadian legal system since before Confederation in 1867. The remainder of
this chapter provides a brief history of the doctrine of precedent at the Supreme Court of
Canada. The discussion is divided into three periods: 1875 to 1949, during which all
Canadian courts were required to follow the judgments of the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council (JCPC), 1950 to 1981, when the Supreme Court achieved independence from
the JCPC and developed its own approach to precedent; and 1982 to the present, when the
Court was forced to reformulate how it treated previously decided cases to accommodate the
introduction of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
From its creation in 1875 until 1949, the Supreme Court of Canada was an inferior
tribunal in that its decisions could be appealed to and reversed by the JCPC in London. As
the supreme judicial body, the judgments of the JCPC bound all colonial courts that were
subject to English law.39 Moreover, in addition to being bound by the judgments of the JCPC,
the Supreme Court of Canada was also required to follow the judgments of the House of
Lords, including the Lords’ policy of strictly adhering to their own precedents.40
This policy was firmly established in the case of London Street Tramways v. London
City Council.*1At issue was whether the Lords were bound by their previous judgments. In
concluding that the Lords were bound by their own decisions, Lord Halsbury stated that the
inconvenience created by an erroneous decision was minimal “compared with
the... disastrous inconvenience — of having each question subject to being re-argued and the

39 Robins v. National Trust Co. Ltd., [1927] 2 D.L.R. 97.
40 Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Scarborough. Thomson Canada Ltd., 2004), 246, note 102.
41 London Street Tramways v. London City Council, [1894] A.C. 489 (H.L.).
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dealings of mankind rendered doubtful by reason of different decisions... ”42 Under this
approach, the decisions of the House of Lords were regarded as conclusive authorities.43 The
Privy Council, unlike the House of Lords, never accepted that it was absolutely bound by its
own decisions.44 Nevertheless, the JCPC scrupulously adhered to precedents, evidenced by
the fact that there was no instance during this time period in which it explicitly overruled a
previous decision in a constitutional case.45
The Canadian version of this policy was articulated by Duff J. of the Supreme Court
in the 1909 case of Stuart v. Bank o f Montreal. Justice Duff explained that,
This court is, of course, not a court of final resort in the sense in which
the House of Lords is because our decisions are reviewable by the Privy
Council; but only in very exceptional circumstances would the ... Lords
Justices, sitting in appeal... have felt themselves at liberty to depart from
their own previous decisions... Quite apart from this, there are, I think,
considerations of public convenience too obvious to require statement
which make it our duty to apply this principle to the decisions of this court.46
Justice Duff s statement is a clear indication that the Court regarded itself as absolutely
bound to follow the decisions of the JCPC. While Duff J. did not completely deny that the
Court could depart from precedent, such departures were justifiable “only in very exceptional
circumstances.” Thus, Supreme Court of Canada’s attitude toward the application of
precedent during this period paralleled the rigid, mechanistic approach which prevailed in
England.
Not all Canadians were content with the inferior status of the Supreme Court in the
years immediately after Confederation. As one commentator observed, “In the years between
1875 and 1949 the abolition of appeal to the Privy Council was never far from the political
42 Ibid.,
43 Cross, 106.
44 Tooth v. Power, [1891] A C. 127 (P.C.).
45 Bora Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law (Toronto: Carswell Co. Ltd., 1966), 191; see also Hogg, 247
at note 110. Hogg notes that the “Privy Council did occasionally depart from precedent, but never admitted
that it was doing s o ” As an example, he cites the Radio Reference, [1932] A.C. 304 (P.C.) and A.G.
Ontario (Labour Conventions), [1937] A.C. 326 (P.C.).
46 Stuart v. Bank of Montreal, [1909] 41 S.C.R. 516, 535.
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iScene.”47 The Privy Council’s critics objected to having decisions of national significance
made by a tribunal so far removed from the realities of life in Canada. They claim that their
Lordships’ lack of familiarity with Canada’s affairs caused them to misinterpret the British
North America Act in a manner that “produced a constitution that was nearly the reverse of
the system of government intended by the framers of that document.”48 This unsatisfactory
condition led to multiple attempts to abolish appeals to the Privy Council.
The first attempt occurred in 1875 as part of the act that established the Supreme
Court of Canada. In its original form, the act included a clause that would have eliminated all
appeals to the Privy Council. However, following a threat by the Secretary of State for
Colonies that royal assent would be withheld, the clause was removed and replaced by one
that recognized the right of appeal to the JCPC.49 The next attempt took place in 1888 when
Parliament enacted an amendment to the Criminal Code providing for the abolition of
appeals to the JCPC in all criminal matters. That amendment remained in effect for thirtyeight years, until it was declared invalid by the Privy Council in Nadan v. The K ing50
In 1933, Parliament again enacted legislation to abolish the right of appeal to the
JCPC in criminal cases. Two years later, the Privy Council upheld this legislation in a
decision that was “based upon the constitutional changes produced by the Statute of
Westminster.”51 Specifically, the Statute of Westminster, which was enacted in 1931,
conferred on the colonies the power to repeal or amend Imperial Statutes. The JCPC held that
the legislation abolishing criminal appeals in Canada was a valid exercise of this new

47 Mark MacGuigan, “Precedent and Policy in the Supreme Court,” The Canadian Bar Review 45, no. 4
(1967): 629.
48 William Livingston, “Abolition of Appeals from Canadian Courts to the Privy Council,” Harvard Law
Review 64 (1950): 105; see also Alan Cairns, The Judicial Committee and Its Critics,” Canadian Journal of
Political Science 4 (1971): 301 - 345,
49 Livingston, 105.
50 Nadan v. The King, [1926] A.C. 482 (P.C.).
51 Livingston, 107.
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power.52 Finally, the Canadian government introduced a bill in 1939 to abolish the remaining
appeals to the JCPC. It became law in 1949 after being upheld by the Privy Council in A. G.
Ontario v. A.G. Canada53 Since that time, the Supreme Court has been the final court of
appeal in all matters relating to Canadian law.
Despite its newly acquired freedom, the Supreme Court continued to strictly follow
its own precedents and those established by the Privy Council from 1949 until approximately
the late 1950s. During this period, Donald Fouts contends that, with a few exceptions, the
Court continued to adhere “rigorously to the doctrine of stare decisis.”54 Gradually, the Court
relaxed its approach, and accepted that it was not absolutely bound by its own decisions or
those of the JCPC. In Re The Farm Products Marketing Act, a case decided in 1957, the
Supreme Court signalled for the first time its willingness to relax the rule which it had
imposed on itself in Stuart v. Bank o f Montreal55 In his concurring opinion, Justice Rand
stated that,
The powers of this Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction are no
less in scope than those formerly exercised in relation to Canada
by the Judicial Committee. From time to time the Committee has
modified the language used by it in the attribution of legislation
to the various heads of ss. 91 and 92... and that incident of judicial
power must, now.. .be exercised in revising or restating those
formulations that have come down to us.56
Despite Justice Rand’s statement, Professor Hogg notes that the first time the Court actually
refused to follow a Privy Council decision in a constitutional case did not occur until 1978.57
Perhaps the most important development to have an impact on the doctrine of
precedent in Canada during the period from 1950 to 1981 took place, ironically, in England.
52 British Coal Co. v. The King, [1935] A.C. 500 (P.C.).
53 A.G. Ontario v. A.G. Canada, [1947] A.C. 127 (P.C.).
54 Donald Fouts, “Policy-Making in the Supreme Court of Canada, 1950-1960,” in Glendon Schubert and
David Danelski (eds.) Comparative Judicial Behavior: Cross-Cultural Studies of Political Decision-Making
in the East and West (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 261.
55 Re The Farm Products Marketing Act, [1957] S.C.R. 198; 7 D.L.R. (2d) 257.
56 Ibid., 272.
57 Hogg, 246. The case is Re Agricultural Products Marketing Act, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1198.
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That development was the House of Lords’ Practice Statement of 1966, in which the Lords
declared that they were prepared to “depart from previous decisions when it appears right to
do so.”58 The Practice Statement effectively abolished the rule of absolute stare decisis that
was created by the Lords in London Tramways Co. v. L. C. C., and followed by courts
throughout England and Canada.59 Moreover, Gordon Bale argues that the Practice Statement
“helped to prepare a favourable climate for such a declaration in Commonwealth legal
circles.”60
In the years immediately after the Practice Statement, the Supreme Court of Canada
came to accept a more flexible rule of stare decisis. This change of attitude is reflected in
Chief Justice Laskin’s statement in Harrison v. Carswell, in which he explains that, “[t]his
Court, above all others in this country, cannot be simply mechanistic about previous
decisions, whatever the respect it would pay to such decisions.”61 Throughout the 1970s, the
Court overruled or refused to follow its previous decisions on a number of occasions.62 Since
then, the Court’s approach to stare decisis is based on the principle that no decision is
absolutely binding.
From 1950 to 1981, the Court also formulated certain rules governing the operation
of precedent in the Canadian legal system. The first was the hierarchical, or vertical rule of
stare decisis, under which the decisions of the Supreme Court are binding on all “inferior”
courts in Canada. In Woods Manufacturing v. The King, a case decided two years after
appeals to the JCPC were completely abolished, the Court unequivocally asserted its position

58 Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent), [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234 (H.L.).
59 Cross, 107.
60 Gordon Bale, “Casting Off the Mooring Ropes of Binding Precedent” The Canadian Bar Review 58, no.
2 (1980): 257.
61 Harrison v. Carswell, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 200, 202.
62 Hogg, 246.
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at the top of the Canadian judicial hierarchy63 Chief Justice Rinfret, speaking for the full
court, stated that, “It is fundamental to the due administration of justice that the authority of
decisions be scrupulously respected by all courts upon which they are binding,”64
However, stare decisis does not apply horizontally to the decisions of coordinate
courts. For instance, a decision by a local judge in Windsor is not binding on other local
judges throughout Ontario. The same rule applies to the decisions of provincial appellate
courts. As Chief Justice Laskin explained in Wolfv. The Queen, “A provincial appellate
Court is not obliged, as a matter either of law or of practice, to follow the decision of the
appellate Court of another province... ,”63 Thus, the Canadian judicial system is based on a
hierarchical structure in which precedential authority flows vertically from the top down.
Another significant development relating to the doctrine of precedent occurred in
1980 as the result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Sellars v. The Queen. In Sellars, the
Court fundamentally altered the traditional common law distinction between the ratio
decidendi and obiter dicta by holding that statements made in obiter are binding on lower
courts.66 Traditionally, obiter statements of a high court have been accorded respect by lower
courts, but have never been considered binding.67 Whenever lower courts follow these obiter
statements, they have done so voluntarily. Through its decision in Sellars, the Court
significantly expanded the portion of its judgments which are considered binding on lower
courts by altering the traditional distinction between ratio and obiter.
Sellars was convicted of murder based primarily on the evidence of an admitted
accessory after the fact. He appealed the conviction on the ground that the trial judge failed to

63 Woods Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The King, [1951] S.C.R. 504. Stare decisis also applies in Quebec, see
Daoust, Lalonde and Cie Ltee v. Ferland, [1932] S.C.R. 343, 351.
64 Ibid., 515.
65 Wolfv. The Queen, [1974] 47 D.L.R. (3d) 741.
66 Sellars v. The Queen, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 527; 110 D.L.R. (3d) 629.
67 Cross, 80.
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instruct the jury that they should be cautious in relying on this uncorroborated evidence.
Specifically, he argued that juries should apply the same standard when considering the
veracity of uncorroborated evidence given by accessories after the fact as is used to consider
evidence given by accomplices.68 The trial judge ruled against Sellars and instructed the jury
that because the witness was an accessory after the fact, “there was therefore no need to warn
them as to the danger of accepting his uncorroborated evidence as if he were an
accomplice.”69
After Sellar’s trial, the Supreme Court of Canada held in Paradis v. The Queen that
the testimony of accessories after the fact was subject to the same evidentiary rules that apply
to accomplices.70 Although this statement was obiter, the Supreme Court relied on Paradis to
reach its decision in Sellar’s appeal. Specifically, the Court held that the trial judge erred in
his instruction to the jury, but dismissed Sellar’s appeal because “no substantial wrong or
miscarriage of justice resulted from the misdirection... .”71 Therefore, Sellars is significant for
establishing that “where the Supreme Court expresses an opinion on a point of law, then such
ruling is binding on lower Courts notwithstanding it was not absolutely necessary to rule on
the point in order to dispose of the appeal.”72
A number of commentators initially argued that the Sellars judgment dramatically
altered the common law in Canada. For example, discussing the effect of Sellers case in an
article published one year after the judgment, Gilbert argued that it had the potential to
produce a “radical change in the principle of stare decisis... ,”T3 However radical the Court’s
decision in Sellars appeared at the time, its long-term effect has been minimal. In fact, the
68 Sellars, 528.
69 Ibid.
70 Paradis v. The Queen, [1978] S.C.R. 264.
71 Sellars, 527.
72 Ibid.
73 Geoffrey Gilbert, “Stare Decisis-Value of Obiter Dictum-Supreme Court of Canada,” The Canadian Bar
Review 60 (1982): 375.
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Court has stated in subsequent decisions that obiter dicta comments do not bind lower
courts.74
From 1982 to the present, the Supreme Court substantially refined its approach to
stare decisis. In particular, the changes produced by the introduction of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 forced the Court to reconsider its jurisprudence in a number
of areas of law. While the Court continued to believe that “compelling circumstances” were
necessary to justify departing from a prior decision, the Justices have also indicated that they
consider the Charter a sufficient basis on which to alter precedent. For example, in Therens,
the majority effectively overruled an earlier decision governing the interpretation of the term
“detained” in the Bill of Rights, by refusing to apply it in cases involving the Charter.75
Moreover, in his dissenting opinion in R.. v. Bernard, Chief Justice Dickson stated that the
“special mandate” of the Charter requires the Court to reconsider, and where necessary, to
overrule its previous decisions.76 Thus, pre-Charter decisions that fail to respect
constitutionally entrenched values are subject to reversal by the Supreme Court.
Chief Justice Dickson’s opinion in Bernard, which was joined by Lamer J., argued
that the Court should overrule its pre-Charter decision in Leary v. The Queen. The decision in
Leary introduced the distinction between “general” and “specific” intent as it relates to selfinduced intoxication.77 Dickson C. J. maintained that Leary imposes a form of absolute
liability on intoxicated offenders which violates the Charter right to be presumed innocent

74 See Manitoba Provincial Judges Association v. Manitoba (Minister of Justice), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 at par.
168. Chief Justice Lamer stated that, “the remarks of Le Dam J. were strictly obiter dicta, and do not bind
courts below...”
75 R. v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, 639 - 640.
76 R. v. Bernard, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 833, 851.
77 Leary v. The Queen, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 29.
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until proven guilty.78 However, a majority of the Justices disagreed and voted to uphold the
rule established in Leary.
In arguing that Leary should be overruled, Dickson C. J. listed three factors in
addition to the Charter, which would justify the Court departing from a previous decision.
These factors are: (1) the decision has been “attenuated” by subsequent decisions;79 (2) the
decision creates uncertainty;80 (3) the decision should not be overruled where the effect of
overruling would be to expand criminal liability.81 Although the factors listed by Dickson
C. J. are not exhaustive, Bernard was the first time the Court made a serious effort to establish
rules governing the alteration of precedent. These factors were adopted by a majority of the
Justices in Chaulk82 and subsequently refined in B (K.G.).*3 In addition to the factors listed in
Bernard, the Court has also stated that it would be less willing to alter decisions arrived at
after full argument and deliberation.84
The Court added to this list more recently in R. v. Robinson, offering five reasons
why the evidentiary rules established in Beard should be overruled. For the majority, Lamer
C.J. explained that Beard should be overruled because: (1) there were “strong dissenting
opinions” in subsequent cases involving the application of the Beard rules; (2) the rules have
not been followed consistently by lower courts; (3) developments in other jurisdictions
support overruling; (4) there is considerable academic commentary in favour of overruling;
(5) the rules are inconsistent with the Charter.85 Most of the factors listed by Lamer C.J.
relate either directly or indirectly to those which were originally stated in Bernard. These
factors continue to guide the Court in the exercise of its authority to alter precedent.
78 Bernard, 850.
79 Ibid., 855.
80 Ibid., 858.
81 Ibid., 860.
82 R. v. Chaulk, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303.
83 R. v. B. (K.G.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 740.
84 Clark v. Canadian National Railway Co., [1988] 2 S.C.R. 680.
85 R. v. Robinson, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 683.
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The Supreme Court has also indicated that it will alter common law rules when
necessary to keep the law relevant to the needs of a constantly changing society. In R.. v.
Salituro, a unanimous Court stated its willingness to “adapt and develop common law rules
to reflect changing circumstances in society at large.”86 Moreover, the Court approvingly
referred to the Practice Statement in support of the proposition that “too rigid adherence to
precedent may lead to injustice... and also unduly restrict the proper development of law.”87
Accordingly, it is the duty of the Supreme Court to strike the proper balance between the
principle of continuity in the law, and the need to ensure the law develops over time. As a
general rule, the Court will make “slow” and “incremental” changes to the common law,
while leaving “complex” changes to the legislature.88 Taken together, these rules form the
basis of the Supreme Court of Canada’s current approach to the doctrine of precedent.
From a comparative perspective, the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to
precedent is similar to the approaches followed by the High Court of Australia and the U.S.
Supreme Court. Shortly after appeals to the JCPC were abolished, the High Court of
Australia asserted that it was no longer bound by its previous decisions or by the decisions of
the Privy Council.89 The High Court, like the Supreme Court of Canada, believes that
appellate courts have a “creative role” to play in adapting the law to new social conditions,
which, in turn, requires that they have the power to depart from previous decisions.90
The general attitude of the Australian High Court toward the doctrine of precedent is
perhaps captured best by the comments of Justice Murphy in Queensland v. The
Commonwealth. In particular, Justice Murphy stated that, “past judicial decisions should not

R. v. Salituro. [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654, 666.
87 Ibid.
Ibid., 666 - 668.
89 Queensland v. Commonwealth, [1977] 139 C.L.R. 585, 605 (H.C. Aust.).
90 Viro v. The Queen, [1978] 141 C.L.R. 88 (H.C. Aust.).
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be elevated to a status higher than the Constitution itself.”91 Thus, while judicial decisions
may be important, they are not immutable. The Australian High Court has also developed a
four-factor test used to determine whether a precedent should be overruled.92 This test
resembles the one developed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Bernard, but has been
described as “more theoretically sound.”94
The United States Supreme Court has taken a similar approach to the doctrine of
precedent. Specifically, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that stare decisis is “usually the
wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be
settled than that it be settled right.”94 However, precedent is not a “universal inexorable
command,” and the Court will depart from its previous decisions when it is appropriate to do
so.95 In fact, the Court has overruled numerous precedents throughout its over two-hundredyear history.96
This is especially true of cases involving the Federal Constitution, “where correction
through legislative action is practically impossible... ”97 By design, amending the U. S.
Constitution is an extremely difficult task. For that reason, the Supreme Court has been more
willing to overrule its Constitutional decisions compared to its statutory precedents which
Congress can easily “correct” through ordinary legislation.98 The U.S. Supreme Court’s
attitude toward constitutional precedents is perhaps characterized best by the famous maxim
first stated by Justice Douglas, advising his colleagues to remember that it is a Constitution
which judges “swore to support and defend, not the gloss which [their] predecessors may
91 Queensland, 610.
92 Johnv. Federal Commissioner of Taxation, [1989] 166 C.L.R. 417 (H.C. Aust.).
93 Richard Haigh, “A Kindler, Gentler Supreme Court? The Case of Bums and the need for a Principled
Approach to Overruling,” Supreme Court Law Review (2d) 14 (2001): 145 at note 21.
94 Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas Co., [1932] 285 U.S. 393, 406 (Brandeis dissenting).
95 Ibid.
96 See Congress, House, Supreme Court Decisions Overruled by Subsequent Decision, report prepared by
the Congressional Research Service (Washington D C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), 2243 - 2256.
97 Burnet, 406.
98 Payne v. Tennessee, [1991] 501 U.S. 808, 827.
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have put on it.”99 In contrast, the Supreme Court of Canada does not explicitly distinguish
between constitutional and statutory precedents.
One exception to this policy concerns decisions that have become “so embedded” in
the U.S. system of government, such as Roe v. Wade, “that return is no longer possible.”100
Because of their national significance, these cases are regarded as being beyond the power of
the courts to overturn. Moreover, the Court will also strictly adhere to precedents in cases
involving property and contract rights, “where reliance interests are involved.”101 In addition
to these considerations, the U.S. Supreme Court examines whether a precedent has proven
“unworkable,” or been undermined by other legal/factual developments to warrant it being
overruled.102
Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada’s practices relating to precedent are similar to
those followed by the Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court and the High Court of
Australia. In particular, all three tribunals subscribe to a flexible version of stare decisis,
which, while emphasizing the need for continuity in the law, holds that no decision is
beyond review. Notwithstanding what the Supreme Court of Canada has said regarding
the application of stare decisis, its approach remains largely underdeveloped relative to
those of the U.S. and Australian Supreme Courts.
The failure to articulate a clear, consistent doctrine of precedent has generated
considerable confusion among academics and members of the legal community in
Canada. For example, in recent years, scholars have noted that the Supreme Court of Canada

99 Douglas, 736.
100 See Panned Parenthood of Southeastern PA. v. Casey, [1992] 505 U.S. 833, 857. In Casey, the majority
upheld the central holding of Roe v. Wade.
101 Swift & Co. v. Wickham, [1965] 382 U.S. I l l , 116.
102 Casey, 857.
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has been extremely reluctant to explicitly overrule its previous decisions.103 Instead of
overruling, Richard Haigh explains, the Court “almost always engagefs] in hair splitting and
tortured reasoning in an attempt to distinguish its earlier precedents.”104
To add to the confusion, the Court frequently overrules or alters precedent without
saying so, or providing reasons why.105 On the rare occasions when the Court does explicitly
overrule, it has been described as “so dismissive of its own earlier precedent as to lead one to
wonder whether old cases have any value whatsoever.”106 The inquiry will now examine the
“value” of “old cases” by examining the influence of precedent on the decision-making of the
Justices on the Supreme Court of Canada.

103 David Vaver, “Developments in Contract Law: Chief Justice Laskin and the Law of Contracts,”
Supreme Court Law Review 7, no. 1 (1985): 133; see generally Haigh, 139 - 159.
104 Haigh, 141.
105 See United States v. Bums, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283. In Bums, the Court overruled its decisions in Kindler
v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, and Re Ng Extradition, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 858, without
explicitly announcing that the decisions were overruled.
10<fHaigh, 141.
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CHAPTER 2
Review of the Literature
In order to assess the influence of precedent, it is first necessary for researchers to
examine the general features of judicial decision-making behaviour. Throughout the latter
half of the 20th century, social scientists and legal scholars developed a number of theoretical
models that attempt to explain the factors influencing judicial decision-making. These
theories can be classified into three broad explanatory models: the legal model; the strategic
(or moderate) model; and the attitudinal model.
The legal model, which dominated jurisprudential scholarship until the mid-20th
century, holds that precedent is one of the most important factors that judges consider in
making their decisions. At the other end of the theoretical spectrum is the attitudinal model,
which theorizes that, at the level of the Supreme Court, precedent has almost no influence on
rulings of the justices. According to the attitudinal model, Supreme Court justices decide
cases based on their own personal values and policy preferences. Both the legal and
attitudinal models seek to parsimoniously explain and predict judicial behaviour by focusing
on the impact of a particular set of variables considered to be important. Between these two
extremes is the strategic model, which leaves some room for the influence of precedent in
addition to other variables. While the moderate perspective will be briefly examined, this
review will focus primarily on the legal and attitudinal models, because they are the leading
paradigms injudicial behaviour scholarship and most relevant to the present inquiry.
1. The Legal Model
The belief that precedent plays a pivotal role in determining case outcomes derives
from the tenets of the legal model of judicial behaviour. According to the legal model, judges
decide cases based on factors including, case facts, the plain meaning of
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constitutional/statutory texts, legislative intent, canons of construction, and precedent.1The
premise underlying the legal model is that by impartially applying these “legal rules,” or
“neutral principles,” to the facts of the case under consideration, judges can arrive at an
objectively correct decision.2 According to the legal model, the judicial function is to
“discover” the law as it exists, rather than “create” it anew.
Perhaps not surprisingly, support for the legal model comes almost exclusively from
judges and members of the legal academy. This is to be expected given that the legal
profession requires its practitioners to understand and use legal rules such as precedent.
Professor Frederick Schauer has argued that adherents of the legal model espouse an
“idealized” view of judging that emphasizes judicial objectivity and infallibility.3 He explains
that this view is “cultivated by the judiciary, celebrated by the culture of lawyers and law
schools, and accepted by most members of the public.”4 It is common for proponents of the
legal model to assert that judges are objective, impartial, and dispassionate in rendering their
judgments. Whether or not this is true, the idealized view of the judicial function represents
an important philosophical assumption underlying the legal model.
According to the legal model, the process of applying legal rules simply requires
judges to use syllogistic logic and analogous reasoning. Describing this process, Professor
Edward Levi states that, “a proposition descriptive of the first case is made into a rule of law
1 Richard A. Brisbon Jr., “Slaying the Dragon: Segal, Spaeth and the Function of Law in Supreme Court
Decision Making,” American Journal of Political Science 40, no. 4 (1996): 1005.
2 Glenn A. Phelps and John G. Gates, “The Myth of Jurisprudence: Interpretive Theory in the
Constitutional Opinions of Justices Rehnquist and Brennan,” Santa Clara Law Review 31, no. 2
(1991):568; Herbert Wechsler, “Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,” Harvard Law Review
73, no. 1 (1959): 1-35; see also Re AG . Quebec and A.G. Canada, [1982] 140 D.L.R. (3d) 385 at 393. The
Court stated that, “Like legal rules, [conventional rules] are positive rules the existence of which has to be
ascertained by reference to objective standards.”
3 Frederick Schauer, “Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behavior,”
University of Cincinnati Law Review 68 (2000): 624 [hereinafter Schauer, “Incentives,”]; Jeffrey Segal and
Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1993), 17 - 18. [hereinafter Segal and Spaeth, The Attitudinal Model] Segal and Spaeth describe this
phenomenon as the “mythology of judging.”
4 Schauer, “Incentives,” 624.
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and then applied to the next similar situation.”5 Similarly, the late U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Cardozo explained that in deciding cases, judges must search through the existing body of
precedents to find cases with facts and legal questions analogous to those presently under
consideration. From this perspective, judges simply “match the colors of the case at hand
against the colors of the many sample cases spread out upon their desk. The sample nearest in
shade supplies the applicable rule.”6 Therefore, proponents of the legal model maintain that
when a judge determines that two cases are factually and legally similar, the rule of law in the
first case is syllogistically applied to the second case. Although Levi and Cardozo were not
supporters of the legal model, their accounts of the process through which judges apply legal
rules are illustrative of the legalist position.
The notion that objectively correct answers to legal problems can be discerned
through “mechanical” application of “neutral” principles, including precedent, traces its
origins to the work of the renowned English jurist Sir William Blackstone. For Blackstone,
judges are the “depositary of the laws; the living oracles,” who must decide cases “not
according to [their] own private judgment, but according to the known laws and customs of
the land.”7 Blackstone’s description of judges as “living oracles” implies that they have
supernatural, or at least superhuman abilities, and therefore reflects the previously noted
tendency among supporters of the legal model to hold an “idealized” view of the judiciary.
According to Blackstone, judges are not empowered to pronounce new laws, but
rather to “maintain and expound” those already in existence.8 The only exception to this rule
is in the case of laws that are “flatly absurd or unjust.”9 Moreover, judges are under no

5 Edward H. Levi, Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), 1.
6 Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921), 20.
7 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1. (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1979), 69.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid, 69-70.
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obligation to follow laws that are contrary to reason or the divine law. For Blackstone, “it is
an established rule to abide by former precedents, where the same points come again in
litigation.”10He concludes that, “precedents and rules must be followed,” if for no other
reason than “to keep the scale of justice even and steady... ,”n Thus, Blackstone believes that
fairness requires judges to mechanically apply previously announced legal principles to
present situations. Furthermore, judges exercise almost no discretion in the application of
these principles.
Few contemporary commentators accept Blackstone’s description as an exhaustive
explanation of how judges decide cases. However, neo-legalist scholars continue to consider
traditional legal factors as central to the judicial decision-making process. Among them is
Ronald Dworkin, who is perhaps this generation’s most influential legal scholar. In his work,
Taking Rights Seriously. Dworkin challenges the position that judges are free, and in fact
required, to exercise discretion in adjudicating disputes. According to Dworkin, although
precedents only “incline” judges toward certain results, they are “not free to pick and choose
amongst the principles and policies” that make up the doctrine of stare decisis.12 Even in
“hard cases” where there are no existing precedents, judges must “discover what the rights of
the parties are,” and not invent new ones. He insists that, “judges do not have discretion in
the matter of principles... ,”13
Based on Dworkin’s approach, precedent may exert two types of force on subsequent
decisions: an “enactment force” relating to its effect on future cases “covered by its exact
words;” and a “gravitational force,” which refers to its effect on cases that are not directly

10 Ibid, 69.
11 Ibid.
12 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 38.
13 Ibid., 47.
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covered by the language of the precedent.14 The “gravitational force” of a precedent is
justified in terms of fairness; that is, treating like cases alike. As Dworkin explains, “A
precedent is the report of an earlier political decision; the very fact of that decision, as a piece
of political history, provides some reason for deciding other cases in a similar way.”15
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that Dworkin uses a mythological judge named “Hercules” to
illustrate how judges decide cases. Thus, Dworkin’s account of the judicial decision-making
process is similar in many ways to Blackstone’s description. Specifically, both hold an
“idealized” view of judging which is based on file belief that judges exercise almost no
discretion in the application of legal rules such as precedent.
The legal model also receives support from many scholars and jurists who identify
themselves as followers of “interpretivism.” “Interpretivism,” which is sometimes referred to
as “originaiism,” “intentionalism,” or “textualism,” is a theory of constitutional interpretation
that requires judges to locate the meaning of constitutional provisions in the text, the authors’
intent, and in previous judicial decisions.16 According to “interpretivists,” constitutional texts
have a fixed and definite meaning which can be ascertained by examining the
aforementioned sources. An interpretation that does not derive from these sources is regarded
as an illegitimate exercise of judicial power. As U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia

14 Ibid., 113; see also, David Pannick, “A Note on Dworkin and Precedent,” Modem Law Review 43, no. 1
(1980): 37.
15 Dworkin, 133; see also Schauer, “Precedent,” 571. Prof. Schauer explains, “The previous treatment of
occurrence X in manner Y constitutes, solely because of its historical pedigree, a reason for treating X in
manner Y if and when X again occurs.”
16 See Raoul Berger, “Some Reflections on Interpretivism,” George Washington Law Review 55 (1986): 1
- 16; H. Jefferson Powell, “Rules for Originalists,” Virginia Law Review 73 (1987): 659 - 699; Daniel
Farber, “The Originaiism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed,” Ohio State Law Journal 49 (1989): 1085 1106.
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argues, “interpretivism” establishes an objective “criterion that is conceptually quite separate
from the preferences of the judge...,”17
The theory of “interpretivism” emerged in the United States during the 1980s as a
conservative reaction against the perceived “liberal-activism” of the Supreme Court under the
leadership of Chief Justices Earl Warren and Warren Burger. Former U.S. Attorney General
Edwin Meese described the Warren and Burger eras as a “a quarter century of judicial
activism, in which the text of the Constitution, precedent, and certainty were cast aside in
favor of the wild flings of judicial fancy... ,”18 Meese and other critics claimed that the Court
had overstepped its authority by “creating” rights, such as abortion and the Miranda
warnings, which have no textual or historical foundation in the Constitution.19 Thus,
“interpretivism” was designed to limit the discretion of judges, and in particular, the ability of
the judiciary to fundamentally alter the meaning of the Constitution.
While “interpretivism” enjoys considerable support among legal scholars and
members of the Federal judiciary in the U.S., its reception has been far less favourable in
Canada. Since the adoption of die Charter, a relatively small group of scholars has used the
“interpretivist” framework to critique the work of the Supreme Court.20 Two of the Court’s
most vocal “interpretivist” critics, professors Morton and Knopff, argue that the Justices have
interpreted the Charter according to their personal values without regard for text or the
intention of its drafters. According to them, the Court follows a “flexible” approach to
Charter interpretation, which is “of the sort that allows changing white in to black (or oaks

17 Antonin Scalia, “Originaiism: The Lesser Evil,” Cincinnati Law Review 57 (1989): 864. Also see
Antonin Scalia, “The Rule of Law as a Law o f Rules,” University o f Chicago Law Review 56 (1989): 1175
- 1188.
18 Edwin Meese III, “A Return to Constitutional Interpretation from Judicial Law-Making,” New York Law
School Review 40 (1996): 925.
19 Ibid.
20 For a discussion of “interpretivism” in Canada, see K. Michael Stephens, “Fidelity to Fundamental
Justice: An Originalist Construction of Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,”
National Journal of Constitutional Law 13, no. 2 (2002): 183 - 244.
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into poplars)... ”21 Morton and Knopff maintain that the Court has legitimized this flexibility
by importing the “living tree” doctrine into the realm of Charter interpretation.
The “living tree” analogy was first used in Canadian law by Lord Sankey of the JCPC
in a case which dealt with whether women were considered “persons” under the B.N.A. Act
1867.22 Traditionally, the legal definition of a “person” was restricted to men. In deciding that
women were "persons,” Lord Sankey stated that their Lordships do not desire “to cut down
the provisions of the [B.N. A ] Act by a narrow and technical construction, but rather to give
it a large and liberal interpretation... ,”23 Moreover, Lord Sankey described the Constitution
as a “living tree,” which must be “capable of growth and expansion within its natural
limits.”24
The Supreme Court has used the "living tree” doctrine since its first Charter decision
to justify progressively interpreting rights and freedoms. As Justice Estey explained in Law
Society o f Upper Canada v. Skapinker, “Narrow and technical interpretation, if not
modulated by a sense of the unknowns of the future, can stunt the growth of the law and
hence the community it serves.”25 For Morton and Knopff, this approach undermines the
purpose of the constitutional amending procedures, and “makes a mockery of the very
purpose of a written constitution.”26 As a solution, they advise the Court to adopt an
“interpretive” method of interpretation that is faithful to the text and history of the Charter.
As previously noted, support for the legal model is largely limited to legal
commentators and members of the judiciary. In contrast, social scientists have been far more

21 F.L. Morton and Rainer Knopff, “Permanence and Change in a Written Constitution: The ‘Living Tree’
Doctrine and the Charter of Rights,” Supreme Court Law Review l(2d) (1990). 545.
22 Edwards v. A.G. Canada, [1930] A.C. 124 (P.C.).
23 Ibid., 136.
24 Ibid.
25 Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357, 366.
26 Morton and Knopff, 545.
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sceptical of the utility of the legal model to explain the process of judicial decision-making.27
Prior to the 1990s, studies of precedent, like most legal subjects, were generally doctrinal and
descriptive in design.28 Spaeth and Segal suggest that the paucity of empirical research is the
product of difficulties associated with creating testable hypotheses about precedent and the
legal model that meet the scientific standard of “falsifiability.”29
Another reason for the lack of empirical research is the resistance of the legal
academy to the use of social science methodologies to study the work of judges. Choudhry
and Hunter argue that “one of the great shortcomings of Canadian legal scholarship” is its
failure to “engage with political scientists... .”30 In recent years, empirical research conducted
by American scholars has yielded mixed results on the influence of precedent, and the
explanatory power of the legal model as a whole.
Research has shown that the judgments of the Canadian and U.S. Supreme Courts are
replete with citations to, and arguments from, precedent-setting cases. This suggests, prima
facie, that precedent matters, at least to the Justices. For example, based on her analysis of the
“interpretive resources” used by die U.S. Supreme Court during the 1996 Term, Schacter
concluded that, “judicial opinions rank with statutory language as the most frequently cited
resource.”31 In another study, Phelps and Gates conducted a content analysis of the written

27 For an example of this skepticism, see Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, “The Influence of Stare
Decisis on the Votes of United States Supreme Court Justices,” American Jonmal of Political Science 40,
no. 2 (1996): 971 - 998. [hereinafter Segal and Spaeth, “The Influence of Stare Decisis,”]
28 For Canadian examples, see Mark MacGuigan, “Precedent and Policy in the Supreme Court," The
Canadian Bar Review 45 (1967): 627 - 665; J. N. Lyon, “Drybones and Stare Decisis,” McGill Law
Journal 17 (1971): 594 - 622; George F. Curtis, “Stare Decisis at Common Law in Canada,” University of
British Columbia Law Review 12 (1978): 1 - 14.
29 Harold Spaeth and Jeffrey Segal, Majority Rule or Minority Will: Adherence to Precedent on the U.S.
Supreme Court (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 314. [hereinafter Spaeth and Segal,
Majority Rulel
30 Sujit Choudhry and Claire Hunter, “Measuring Judicial Activism on the Supreme Court of Canada: A
Comment on Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. NAPE,” McGill Law Journal 48 (2003): 530.
31 Jane S. Schacter, “The Confounding Common Law Originaiism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory
Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond,” Stanford Law Review 39, no.
1 (1998): 28.
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majority opinions of Justices Brennan and Rehnquist, and determined that over 80 per cent of
the constitutional arguments raised by both Justices were based on precedent.32
Similarly, in his analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada’s published judgments,
Peter McCormick found that the Justices referred to 1400 judicial decisions during the 2003
term, which was more than any other source.33 Other Canadian researchers have tried to
assess the “influence” of past and current members of the Supreme Court by statistically
analyzing case citation patterns.34 Moreover, the Court’s use of foreign precedents, especially
those of its American counterpart, has been the focus of considerable research.35 It is
apparent from this research that precedent is an important part of the “content” of judicial
decisions at the appellant level in Canada and the U.S.
While these studies show that judges frequently rely on precedent as an authority on
which to base their decisions, they do not demonstrate that precedent actually influences the
justices’ votes. As Spaeth and Segal explain in their 1999 empirical study of precedent,
simply counting citations “turns stare decisis into a trivial concept, at least for explanatory
purposes.”36 After all, institutional norms require judges to justify their decisions with
precedents. Simply citing precedents does not necessarily mean that they are the “cause” of a
judicial decision. For their study, Segal and Spaeth defined “influence” as the ability to make
someone do something that they otherwise would not have done.37 Accordingly, a claim that

32 Phelps and Gates, 590.
33 Peter McCormick, “The Judges and the Journals: Citation of Periodical Literature by the Supreme Court
of Canada, 1985 - 2004,” The Canadian Bar Review 83 (2004): 638.
34 See generally, Peter McCormick, “The Supreme Court Cites the Supreme Court: Follow-Up Citation on
the Supreme Court of Canada, 1989-1993,” Osgood Hall Law Journal 33, no. 3 (1995): 453-472.
35 See generally, Christopher P. Manfredi, “The Use of United States Decisions by the Supreme Court of
Canada Under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 23, no. 3 (1990):
499-518; S.I. Bushnell, “The Use of American Cases,” University of New Brunswick Law Journal 35
(1986): 157 -1 8 1 .
36 Spaeth and Segal, Majority Rule. 6.
37 Ibid, 23.
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precedent influenced a decision requires that the decision be different from what would have
been decided if the precedent did not exist.
To measure the “influence” of precedent on the U.S. Supreme Court, they examined
the voting behaviour of dissenting judges in “landmark” cases and their “progeny.”
Specifically, Segal and Spaeth operationally defined “precedential influence” as “the extent
to which judges who disagree with a precedent move toward that position in subsequent
cases.”38 A dissenting vote in a precedent-setting case is considered a judge’s “revealed
preference,” because it is a manifestation of his or her preferred outcome.39 Thus, continuing
to vote against the precedent in subsequent cases is considered “preferential” behaviour,
while switching in favour of it is attributed to the influence of precedent. Although
recognizing that other variables may be responsible for producing the observed change in
judicial preference, Segal and Spaeth believe their approach provides a valid and reliable
measure of the influence of precedent.
Based on a comprehensive examination of judicial voting behaviour throughout the
Court’s history, Segal and Spaeth concluded that the Justices are “rarely influenced by stare
decisis,”40 Of the 2425 votes in their data set, only 288, or 11.9 per cent, were classified as
“precedential.”41 In their earlier research based on the same methodology, Segal and Spaeth
found that the justices switched to the position established in the precedent from which they
dissented a mere 9.2% of the time.42 Their data indicate that, with the exceptions of Stewart
and Powell, the Justices votes were “overwhelmingly supportive” of their original

38 Ibid., 5.
39 Segal and Spaeth, “The Influence o f Stare Decisis,” 975; Ainartya Sen, “Behaviour and the Concept of
Preference,” Economica 40 (1973): 241 - 259.
40 Spaeth and Segal, Majority Rule. 288.
41 Ibid.
42 Segal and Spaeth, “The Influence of Stare Decisis,” 983.
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preferences.43 In fact, the Justices voted consistently with their original preferences at a
minimum rate of at least 80 percent.44
In another study, Brenner and Spaeth examined the extent to which stare decisis
influences the votes of Justices in cases where the U.S. Supreme Court has altered precedent.
They assumed that when a judge votes to overrule or alter a precedent, his or her behaviour
conflicts with the legal model.45 While acknowledging that some nonconformity to precedent
is permissible under a “lax” policy of stare decisis, Brenner and Spaeth argue that they were
“compelled to make this assumption in order to test the legal model.”46 Thus, a Justice
conforms to the legal model by either voting with the majority in the altered decision and
dissenting from its altering in a subsequent decision, or by dissenting in both the altered and
altering decisions. Using this methodology, Brenner and Spaeth failed to uncover evidence in
support of the position advanced by proponents of the legal model that precedent has a
substantial influence on judicial decision-making.47 Taken together, these empirical studies
indicate that precedent, which is a central component of the legal model, has limited
influence on the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.
In the absence of empirical evidence, it is difficult to know with any certainty the
extent to which Justices on the Supreme Court of Canada are influenced by precedent in their
decision-making. However, there are reasons to expect that legal factors exert a similar
degree of influence on American and Canadian judges. The first reason is that all judges are
humans, meaning that they have individual values, attitudes, and tendencies, which are bound

43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Saul Brenner and Harold J. Spaeth, Stare Indecisis: The Alteration of Precedent on the U.S. Supreme
Court. 1946-1992 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 73. [hereinafter Brenner and Spaeth,
Stare Indecisis]
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.; See Donald R. Songer and Stefanie A. Lindquist, “Not the Whole Story: The Impact of Justices’
Values on Supreme Court Decision Making,” American Journal of Political Science 40, no. 4 (1996): 1061.
These researchers found that precedent did influence the Justices in “some categories of cases...”
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to influence their decision-making.48 As Chief Justice McLachlin stated in a 2004 speech,
“Judges are human. They are not living oracles.”49 Her remark was intended to break down
the idealized image of judges and show that judicial decision-making is governed by the
same principles that affect all human decision-making.
Tversky and Kahneman have argued that when faced with a decision-making
situation, individuals employ a “decision frame,” which refers to the “decision-maker’s
conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with a particular choice.”50
Experimental research demonstrated that individuals will often rely on a biased “decision
frame” by considering only those factors which support their preferred outcome.51 There is
no reason to believe that judges are any more or less influenced by their psychological traits
and biases than other individuals.
Another reason to doubt the explanatory power of the legal model is the inherent
generality of statutory and constitutional language. Most legal terms, like ordinary words,
have a range of possible meanings depending on the context within which they are used.
However, the language used in many constitutional texts is particularly general and
imprecise, which makes it extremely difficult forjudges to agree upon a definition for terms
such as “unreasonable search and seizure” or “cruel and unusual treatment.” Chief Justice
McLachlin has stated that “the broad, general language of the Charter permits a variety of
interpretations and leaves judges no choice but to infuse their own values... ” in deciding

48 Jerome Frank, “Are Judges Human?” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 80 (1931): 17 - 53.
49 Beverley McLachlin, “Judging in a Democratic State,” Sixth Templeton Lecture on Democracy,
University of Manitoba, 3 June 2004, online, available from http://www.scccsc.gc.ca/AboutCourt/judges/speeches/DemocraticState e.asp.
50 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,”
Science 211 (1981): 453.
51 Ibid.
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cases.52 This statement conflicts with the legalist position that legal texts have a “fixed” and
“determinant” meaning.
Furthermore, the individual characteristics of judges combined with the
indeterminacy of legal language may explain why judges regularly author separate opinions.
According to the legal model, a group of judges should be able to examine the same facts,
apply the same legal rules, and arrive at the same conclusion. However, as Maclvor has
argued, “the frequency of dissenting (and concurring) opinions on the Supreme Court belies
the suggestion that judges mechanically apply impartial rules of construction or precedential
dogma.”53 Nevertheless, the absence of empirical evidence makes it premature to completely
discount the influence of legal factors on the decision-making of Supreme Court Justices in
Canada.
2. The Strategic (Moderate) Model
Conversely, the strategic model of judicial behaviour holds that precedent does
influence judges, in addition to other legal, institutional, and personal factors.54 In contrast to
the legal model, which is predicated on the notion that legal rules (i.e. precedent) determine
judicial preferences, the strategic approach maintains that precedent constrains judges’ ability
to vote according to their personal preferences. Proponents of the strategic model reject the
mythological view of judging espoused by neo-legalists, preferring instead to consider judges
as strategic actors who seek to maximize their own preferences.55 In attempting to maximize
their preferences, judges are constrained by institutional rules and norms, as well as by the
actions of other judges. While strategic scholars accept the attitudinalist position that
52 Beverley McLachlin, “The Charter of Rights and Freedoms: A Judicial Perspective,” University of
British Columbia Law Review 23 (1989): 583.
53 Heather Maclvor, Canadian Politics and Government in the Charter Era (Toronto: Thomson Canada Ltd.,
2006), 103.
54 For a detailed discussion o f the legal moderate position, see Nancy Maveety, ed., The Pioneers o f
Judicial Behavior (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), 193.
55 Schauer, “Incentives,” 615; See Richard Posner, “What do Judges Maximize? (The Same Thing
Everybody Else Does),” Supreme Court Economic Review 3 (1994): 1.
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personal preferences are important, they point to the interaction of preferences with collegial
choice, institutional norms, and opinion formation variables.56
The intellectual antecedents of the moderate model are economic and social
psychological theories predicated on the assumptions of human rationality and utility
maximization. Glendon Schubert is widely regarded as the first social scientist to apply
economic and social psychological models to the study of judicial behaviour. In his
groundbreaking book, Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior. Schubert used game theory
to analyze the decisions of Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court.57 At that time, game theory
was relatively new in the social sciences, and was used almost exclusively to examine
economic phenomena Game theoretic models, such as the prisoner’s dilemma, are used to
predict the behaviour of rational actors in a specified decision-making environment. The goal
of the actors is to obtain for themselves the “maximum share of utility consistent with the
minimum risk of receiving a lesser or no share at all.”58
In two-player games, the interests of the actors are assumed to be in conflict;
however, if there are more than two players, it is in the interests of two or more actors to
cooperate and form a coalition in order to maximize their joint utility. Schubert argued that in
order to maximize their utility, Supreme Court Justices had to first recognize their
interdependency.59 Schubert was referring to the fact that appellate court judges need the
support of other judges in order to form a majority coalition. Hence, their decisions depend,
to a certain extent, on the decisions of other judges. Although many legal scholars initially
criticized the use of game theory, Schubert’s work is now regarded as “pioneering” for

56 Maveety, 193.
57 Glendon Schubert, Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959).
58 Ibid., 175.

59

j
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having demonstrated that approaches based on the assumption of rationality could be applied
to “important political problems,” including Supreme Court decision-making.60
Over the past three decades, a number of variations of the strategic approach have
been developed which are based on the insights of Schubert’s early game theory research.61
The cooperative model is a variation of the strategic paradigm often associated with the work
of Walter Murphy, which focuses on the dynamics of decision-making in a small group
context. It theorizes that, “justices support stare decisis not because they normatively feel
that they ought to, but because the long-term survival of their policy goals depends on it."62
Judges at the appellate level seeking to establish or uphold a legal rule that reflects their
preferred policy position need the support of other judges. Consequently, they might alter
their preference to accommodate the preferences of other judges on the court.63 Appeals to
pre-existing norms, such as precedent, can be an effective strategy for consensus building.
Scholars using strategic-choice models have theoretically demonstrated that, under
certain conditions, judges may cooperate and respect precedents to ensure the survival of
their policy goals.64 To illustrate how cooperative behaviour among policy-motivated judges
could produce respect for precedent, consider the hypothetical case used by Spaeth and
Segal, which involves two judges, called A and B. Suppose that a decision to overrule a
precedent involves some loss in institutional prestige, and that the judges are risk averse.65

60 Lee Epstein and Jack Knight, “Walter F. Murphy: The Interactive Nature of Judicial Decision Making,”
in Nancy Maveety, ed., The Pioneers of Judicial Behavior (Ann Arbor; University of Michigan Press,
2003), 203. Although this chapter is primarily about the work of Walter Murphy, it also discusses
Schubert’s contributions to the field of judicial behavioral studies.
61 For examples of these variations, see Jeffrey Segal, “Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory
of Congress and Courts,” American Political Science Review 91 (1997): 28 - 44; Rafael Gely and Pablo
Spiller, “A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Decision Making with Applications to the State
Farm and Grove City Cases,” Journal of Law. Economics. & Organization 6 (1990): 263 - 300.
62 See Spaeth and Segal, Minority Rule, 13; Walter Murphy, James Fleming and William Harris II,
American Constitutional Interpretation (New York: Foundation Press, 1986).
63 Spaeth and Sega1, Minority Rule. 13.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid., 14, citing Tversky and Kahneman, 453.
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Under these conditions, A and B prefer to uphold a decision they agree with to overruling a
precedent with which they disagree.66
Alternatively, if the situation involved two precedents that will be overruled unless
the judges cooperate, one favoured by judge A and the other by judge B, the model expects
the judges to preserve the status quo, thereby upholding each other’s precedents. Thus,
although judges may be motivated by their own preferences as to what the law should be,
strategic scholars contend that the need for consensus building will cause them to modify
their decisions in the direction of “rules established by existing precedent.”67
The notion that group dynamics influence the behaviour of judges on appellate
tribunals draws heavily on the work of social psychologists examining conformity, deviance,
and leadership. Some strategic scholars have applied this research to study the process of
collegial influence.68 Specifically, these researchers focus on the post-hearing conferences,
the formation of opinion coalitions, and the role of the chief justice. They use memos and
conference notes to gain insight into how judges make decisions and gain the support of other
judges.69 According to Nancy Maveety, this group of strategic scholars, beginning with
Schubert and Murphy, “added the importance of small-group, leadership, and interdependent
decision-making factors in the explanation of judicial choice.”70
The Justices on the Supreme Courts of Canada and the U.S. follow a similar process
in forming their judgments. Justice Wilson’s description of the Supreme Court of Canada’s
opinion formation process consists of four principal steps.71 The first step is the judges’

66 Ibid.
67 Jack Knight and Lee Epstein, “The Norm o f Stare Decisis,” American Journal o f Political Science 40
(1996): 1032.
68 Maveety, 29.
69 Robert Sharpe and Kent Roach, Brian Dickson: A Judge’s Journey (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2003), ix - xiv.
70 Maveety, 193.
71 Bertha Wilson, “Decision-Making in the Supreme Court,” University of Toronto 1 -aw Journal 36 (1986):
236.
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conference after every hearing, during which the judges express their tentative views on the
case in reverse order of seniority, and decide who will draft the opinion or opinions.72 The
conference will usually reveal “whether there is any prospect of unanimity or whether there is
clearly going to be more than one judgment.”73
During the 1960s, Cartwright C.J. introduced the judges’ case conference in an effort
to reduce the number of multiple opinions issued by the Court. In addition to reducing the
frequency of multiple opinions, former Justice L’Heureux-Dube has stated that the case
conference played a “key role... in improving relations among the judges.”74 Perhaps more
importantly, the requirement of face-to-face interaction during the case conferences provides
judges with an opportunity to influence their colleagues.
The second stage involves the drafting of opinions and circulating them to the other
judges. A judge will normally volunteer to author the first draft of the majority judgement or
the Chief Justice will ask someone from the majority to do so.75 The draft is then circulated to
the other justices at which point they “decide whether or not they are going to be able to
concur.”76 Stage three is when members of the panel exchange comments and suggest
amendments to the draft, which the author is free to accept or reject. In an interview with the
Globe and Mail, former Supreme Court Justice Peter Cory explained that when authoring
majority opinions, it is common to receive memos from other justices which read, “I agree to
A and to B, but not to C - and over my dead body to D.”77 If a judge is unable to accept the
draft reasons for judgment, he or she may propose a dissent, or author a concurring opinion.
At stage four, the judges have read all of the opinions and must decide which one to join.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Claire L’Heureux-Dube, “The Dissenting Opinion: Voice of the Future?” Osgoode Hall Law Journal 38
(2000): 500.
75 Wilson, 236.
76 Ibid.
77 Kirk Makin, “Top-court judge defends bench,” The Globe and Mail. 3 March 1999, A5.
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It is clear from Justice Wilson’s description and Justice Coiy’s comments that
Supreme Court opinions reflect the need to accommodate the views of other justices through
bargaining and compromise. Throughout the four stages, judges act strategically to influence
the outcome of the case and the legal principles articulated therein. Based on their
examination of the opinion formation process on the U.S. Supreme Court, Wahlbeck,
Spriggs, and Maltzman concluded that, “the wording and scope of final majority opinions”
reflects to a large extent the level of accommodation among the judges.78
The level of compromise on a court is affected by a number of factors, including the
ability of the Chief Justice to “broker whatever compromises are necessary to produce a
unanimous judgement,” or at least to reduce the number of concurring and dissenting
opinions.79 In fact, chief justices are often evaluated based on their ability to generate clear,
unanimous judgments in important cases.80 More importantly, strategic scholars argue that
the dynamics of face-to-face interaction and peer influence affect the extent to which a court
adheres to its own previous decisions.
Another variation of the strategic account maintains that judges follow stare decisis
as a matter of institutional legitimacy. Commentators such as former U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Lewis Powell Jr. argue that respect for precedent enhances the legitimacy of court
rulings.81 Under this view, adherence to precedent contributes to the perception that
judgments are based on law and not on arbitrarily imposed preferences, which is essential to
maintaining the legitimacy of the judiciary. Canon and Johnson explain that a court decision
78 Paul Wahlbeck, James Spriggs, and Forrest Maltzman, “Marshalling the Court: Bargaining and
Accommodation on the United States Supreme Court,” American Journal of Political Science 42 (1998):
313.
79 Maclvor, 101.
80 For example, see Peter McCormick, “Follow the Leader: Judicial Power and Judicial Leadership on the
Laskin Court, 1973 - 1984,” Queen’s Law Journal 24 (1998): 237 - 277. McCormick concludes at pg. 265
that although Laskin was a frequent dissenter initially, he exercised “strong and decisive leadership over his
court” in the last four terms.
81 Lewis F. Powell Jr., “Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint,” Washington and Lee Law Review 47, no. 2
(1990): 286.
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is legitimate because the public “concedes that the institution’s proper function in society to
make such a decision and that the decision itself is not grossly biased or totally absurd.”82
Hence, legitimacy does not require the public to accept or agree with a particular court
decision.
Similarly, Knight and Epstein have argued that, in justifying their rulings, judges
must “choose from among a set of rules that the members of that society will recognize and
accept.”83 There are a number of “acceptable rules” which judges can use to explain their
decisions, including statutory texts, canons of construction, and precedent. Consequently,
judges use precedent to justify their decisions because stare decisisis is regarded as an
“acceptable rule” by the general public and legal community. Therefore, concern for the
court’s legitimacy may lead judges to abide by precedents, including those that conflict with
their personal preferences.
Other commentators suggest that judges may abide by precedent to ensure the
implementation of their decisions. Enforcing judicial decisions often requires the cooperation
of other government actors, including Parliament, provincial legislatures, government
departments or agencies, police, and lower courts.84 As McGuire and Stimson have noted,
“while the Court is certainly not eleetorally accountable, those responsible for putting its
rulings into effect frequently are.”85 According to this argument, government officials
seeking to be re-elected may refuse to implement unpopular judicial decisions, or those seen
as illegitimate. For example, politicians and judges in some southern U.S. states refused to

82 Bradley Canon and Charles Johnson, Judicial Policies: Implementation and Impact (Washington D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly Press, 1999), 156.
83 Knight and Epstein, 1021; see also, Jeffery J. Mondak, “Policy Legitimacy and the Supreme Court: The
Sources and Contexts of Legitimation,” Political Research Quarterly 47, no. 3 (1994): 675-692.
84 Canon and Johnson, 26.
85 Kevin A. McGuire and James Stimson, “The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited: New Evidence on
Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences,” Journal of Politics 66, no. 4 (2004): 1019.
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enforce the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board o f Education, which ordered the
desegregation of public schools across the country.86
Murphy hypothesized that the need to ensure the implementation of their decisions
may induce judges to follow precedents, or at least discourage them from overruling previous
decisions. He argued that a court which frequently overruled or refused to adhere to its own
decisions, “could not expect others to respect [those] decisions.”87 For these reasons, strategic
scholars maintain that judges will abide by precedents to enhance the legitimacy of their
rulings, thereby increasing the chance that they will be implemented properly.
Professional reputation is another reason offered by strategic scholars as to why
judges follow precedent.88 In particular, the desire to have a reputation as a consistent,
principled jurist may produce adherence to what Reed Lawler described as a policy of
“personal stare decisis”*9 The traditional theory of stare decisis espoused by proponents of
the legal model posits that the outcome of a case is independent of the deciding judge. It is
therefore “impersonal.” In contrast, “personal stare decisis” recognizes that while “judges are
often inconsistent with each other... each judge is consistent unto himself....”90 To maintain
their own personal consistency, judges attempt to “show the logical link between the
immediate decision and his or her past decisions.”91 It follows that more experienced judges
will have a longer trail of past decisions to wh ich they must conform.
In their previously discussed study of the influence of precedent in cases which
altered precedent, Brenner and Spaeth also tested the influence of “personal stare decisis” on
the votes of the Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court. Rather than conforming to the court’s
86 Maclvor, 126.
87 Murphy, Fleming, and Harris, 308.
88 See Schauer, “Incentives,” 618.
89 Reed Lawlor, “Personal Stare Decisis.” Southern California Law Review 73 (1968). 73.
90 Ibid., 81.
91 McCormick, Peter. “The Supreme Court Cites the Supreme Court: Follow-Up Citation on the Supreme
Court of Canada, 1989 - 1993.” Oseoode Hall Law Journal 33, no. 3 (1995). 461.
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established precedents, “personal stare decisis” occurs when a judge votes consistently with
his or her previous decisions.92 For instance, if a judge dissents from the majority in a
precedent-setting case, and dissents in a subsequent case that relied on the majority opinion
from the original precedent, the judges’ behaviour conforms to “personal stare decisis.”
Brenner and Spaeth found that a majority of judges in their dataset demonstrated
strong support for “personal stare decisis,” which may indicate that reputation is an important
consideration. Specifically, all of the Justices included in their sample “manifested more
support for personal stare decisis than for the legal model.”93 Thus, professional reputation is
another reason advanced by supporters of the strategic model to explain why judges abide by
precedents. It should be noted that although it is an eclectic model with numerous variations,
compared to the legal and attitudinal models, the strategic approach provides perhaps the
most accurate description of the judicial decision-making process.
3. The Attitudinal Model
In contrast to both the legal and moderate models, the attitudinal model posits that
legal factors have virtually no impact on the decisions of Supreme Court Justices. According
to the attitudinal model, the “facts of a case vis-a-vis the ideological values, attitudes, and
preferences of individual justices provide the single best explanation for their votes.”94 The
attitudinal approach to judicial behaviour rests on the theoretical insights of social
psychology, the legal realism movement, and neo-institutionalism. However, testing the
assumptions of the attitudinal model was not possible until the rise of behaviouralism in the
social sciences following WWII and the corresponding development of new empirical
methodologies.

92 Brenner and Spaeth. Stare Indecisis. 73.
93 Ibid., 85.
94 Segal, 33.
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The legal realism movement, which emerged at the turn of the 20th century,
challenged many of the basic assumptions on which the legal model rested. Early realists
attempted to inject the “spirit of scientific investigation” into the study of law. For this
reason, the legal realism movement has been described as the “first significant and visible
intersection between applied social science and legal scholarship.”95 As Spaeth and Segal
explain, the legal realists argued that the “reigning orthodoxy, [Blackstone’s] mechanical
jurisprudence, poorly described what judges actually did.”96
This sentiment is evident in the works of the venerable American jurist Oliver W.
Holmes, who is regarded by many as the father of legal realism. In his influential article,
“The Path of the Law,” Holmes stated, “The danger of which I speak is not the admission
that the principles governing other phenomena also govern the law, but the notion that a
given [legal] system... can be worked out like mathematics... ”97 In Holmes’s view, “the life
of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”98 Legal realists view law as an
institution constantly in flux, and not as a set of stable propositions capable of being neutrally
applied on a case-by-case basis.
The concern of realists is with what legal actors actually do, rather than what they
say. Consequently, realists argue that judicial opinions citing precedent are merely post hoc
rationalizations, not the cause of the decision itself.99 For realists, judicial opinions reveal
only the “superficial and announced determinants of judicial decisions,” not the “real

95 Michael Heise, “The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making
and the New Empiricism,” University of Illinois Law Review 2002 (2002): 822.
96 Spaeth and Segal, Majority Rule. 16.
97 Oliver W. Holmes, “The Path of the Law,” Harvard Law Review 10, no. 8 (1897): 465. [hereinafter
Holmes, The Path of the Law,”]
98 Oliver W. Holmes, The Common Law (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1963), 5.
99 See generally, Karl N. Llewellyn, “Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules or
Canons about how Statutes are to be Construed,” Vanderbilt Law Review 3, no. 1 (1950): 395-406.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

45
determinants” of those decisions.100 Proponents of realism complained that legal scholarship
was overly concerned with studying the “announced determinants” of judicial decisions.
This is reflected by the two main forms of legal research — theoretical and doctrinal
— which Professor Schuck explains are representative of “almost the entire corpus of legal
scholarship.”101 In order to uncover the “real determinants” of judicial behaviour, legal
realists advocated the use of empirical methodologies to study the work of judges. Realists
maintain that the failure to develop a tradition of empirical legal scholarship accounts for
why so little is known of the “real determinants” of judicial behaviour.
Realists also challenge the notion that precedent “binds” future decision-makers,
pointing out that judges can always find some aspect of the future case on which to
“distinguish” it from the earlier one.102 Moreover, they argue that precedent is a superfluous
doctrine, given that in any legal dispute, there are usually precedents capable of supporting
both sides.103 Noted realist Max Radin described the rule of precedent as “an instrument
capable of a great many variations and allowing movement in ways that have little obvious
relation to the direction indicated in the precedent.”104
In a similar vein, Holmes maintained that many of the components of the legal
model, such as statutory language and precedent, could be used by judges to give almost “any
conclusion a logical form.”105 Therefore, rather than a constraint, realists see precedent as
concealing the considerable discretion exercised by judges in deciding cases. The modem
attitudinal model has been heavily informed by the realist belief that legal rules, such as
precedent, do not accurately explain judicial decisions.
100 Schauer, “Incentives,” 619.
101 Peter Schuck, “Why Don’t Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?” Journal of Legal Education
39 (1989): 329.
102 David M. Adams, Philosophical Problems in the Law. 3rd ed. (Scarborough: Wadsworth, 2000), 77.
103 Ibid.
104 Max Radin, “Case Law and Stare Decisis: Concerning Prajudizienrecht in Amerika,” Columbia Law
Review 33 (1933), 203.
105 Holmes, “The Path of the Law,” 466.
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The attitudinal model has also been influenced by neo-institutionalist theories, which
focus on how decision-making environments are shaped by institutional rules and structures.
Specifically, the attitudinal model accepts the neo-institutionalist position that the degree of
discretion exercised by judges is a function of their institutional environment.106 According to
attitudinalists, Supreme Court justices are able to vote based on their personal values and
preferences because they are not politically accountable, enjoy lifetime tenure, and control
their own agenda.107
Although these factors were initially developed to describe the environment of the
U.S. Supreme Court, similar institutional rules make it possible to apply them to the Supreme
Court of Canada. Under the terms of the Supreme Court Act, the Court is composed of a
Chief Justice and eight puisne judges who are appointed by the Prime Minister and serve
until the age of seventy-five. The Justices cannot be removed unless their conduct deviates
from the statutory standard of “good behaviour.”108 To be eligible to serve on the Court, an
individual must have been a provincial superior court judge or an attorney with at least ten
years’ standing at the bar of a province. Furthermore, the Act prohibits j ustices from holding
any other political office. Finally, with a few exceptions, the Supreme Court of Canada
controls its own agenda. In sum, the institutional rules and structures governing the judicial
system make it possible for the Justices on the Supreme Court of Canada to decide cases
according to their ideological values and attitudes if they so choose.
Each of the approaches to judicial decision-making that have been discussed requires
researchers to identify the preferences of individual judges. Because the attitudinal model
expects judges to decide cases based on personal preferences, analysts must determine what

106 Segal, 29.
107 Spaeth and Segal, Majority Rule. 18-19.
108 See Department of Justice Canada, Supreme Court Act. R.S. 1985, c. S-26, online, available from
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/S-26/text.html.
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those preferences are before they can test whether they have any influence. The first scholar
to comprehensively test the attitudinal model, political scientist Gendon Schubert, developed
a method for determining judicial preferences by ordering the characteristics of a given case
and the judicial decision based on them along ideological dimensions.109 Schubert employed
scalogram analysis, also called cumulative scaling or Guttman scaling, which is a technique
used by psychologists to measure attitudes toward certain stimuli. An attitude is defined as an
“enduring syndrome of response consistency with regard to a set of social objects.”110 The
aim of cumulative scaling is to determine whether responses to stimuli are the result of a
single dominant attitudinal variable.
In order to illustrate Schubert’s application of cumulative scaling to judicial
behaviour, consider two police searches which involved nearly identical facts and uncovered
equally incriminating evidence. For this hypothetical scale, the attitudinal variable under
investigation is the justices’ attitudes toward search and seizure cases. Suppose, further, that
the police obtained a warrant for the first search but did not for the second.111 According to
Schubert, the first search is more protective of individual liberty than the second because a
warrant was obtained. For this reason, case 1 is considered “liberal” and should be placed to
the left of case 2 on the line representing ideological space.112 The justices who decide these
cases can also be placed along the ideological space. Due to their position in Figure 2. A,
justice A may be described as a liberal, B as a moderate, and C as a conservative.

109 Brenner and Spaeth, Stare Indecisis. 59.
110 S. R. Peck, “The Supreme Court of Canada, 1958 —1966: A Search for Policy through Scalogram
Analysis,” The Canadian Bar Review 45 (1967): 668.
111 This example is based on the ones used by Brenner and Spaeth, Stare Indecisis. 59-60; and Segal, 29.
112 Brenner and Spaeth, Stare Indecisis. 60.
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Figure 2.A
Hypothetical cases and judges in ideological space
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Justice B
Case 1

Justice C
Case 2

Figure reprinted from: Saul Brenner and Harold Spaeth, Stare Indecisis: The Alteration of Precedent on the
Supreme Court. 1946-1992 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 60.

Schubert hypothesized that a judge “will vote to uphold any search to the left of his
point in the space and void any search to his right.”113 Judge A will therefore vote in favour
of the defendants in each case (and void the searches), while judge C will uphold the legality
of both searches. However, if justice A voted against the defendant in case 2, that response is
considered inconsistent and may be the result of an attitude other than the one under
investigation.
Scales produce a measure called the “coefficient of reproducibility,” the size of which
indicates the degree that an actual response pattern corresponds to that of a perfect scale.114 A
coefficient of reproducibility of .90 suggests “unidimensionality” in a scale, meaning that the
responses are likely the result of the hypothesized attitude.115 Suppose that in the above
example justice A participated in a series of search and seizure cases, and voted consistently
in favour of the “liberal” (defined as pro-defendant) position. If justice A’s scaled votes in
these cases produced a coefficient of reproducibility of .90, it would be reasonable to
conclude that justice A voted according to his or her attitude toward search and seizure cases.
Canadian scholars have used scalogram analysis to study the work of the Supreme
Court since the mid-1960s. For example, in 1967 S. R. Peck examined the decisions of the

113 Ibid.
114 Schubert, 271.
115
Ibid. See, Earl Babbie and Lucia Benaquisto, Fundamentals of Social Research (Scarborough: Thomson
Canada Ltd., 2002): 155-156.
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Supreme Court from 1958 to 1966 in the areas of taxation, negligence, and criminal law.
Peck’s taxation scale produced a coefficient of reproducibility of .93, which indicates that the
“justices reach their decisions on the basis of their attitudes to taxation.”116 Moreover, when
the justices’ votes in taxation cases are dichotomously classified as either “pro-taxpayer” or
“pro-government,” the scale demonstrated that Justice Cartwright consistently took a “pro
taxpayer” position, whereas Justices Abbott and Fauteux were the most “pro-government.”117
In his contribution to Schubert and Danelski’s 1969 publication, Comparative
Judicial Behavior. Donald Fouts constructed scalograms to assess the decisions of the
Supreme Court from 1950 to 1960 in cases involving civil liberties, economic regulation,
taxation, and labour-management relations. Fouts concluded that during the 1950s, the
Supreme Court was generally “pro-economic liberalism” and slightly “anti-civil liberties.”118
Perhaps more significantly, Fouts’s data confirmed what many political scientists suspected,
which is that the four Justices from Quebec (Taschereau, Fauteux, Rinffet, and Abbott)
consistently voted together as a block in economic and civil liberties cases.119
The validity of Schubert’s model and the other early cumulative scaling techniques
used to identify judicial attitudes has been subject to considerable criticism.120 Because
judges, unlike other political actors, are not disposed to reveal their values and attitudes,
researchers must rely on their votes as “surrogates for those beliefs.”121 The problem, as
Segal explains, is that “the measures for the independent and dependent variables are
identical.” In other words, early versions of the attitudinal model were flawed because they
116 Peck, 684.
117 Ibid., 688.
118 Donald Fouts, “Policy-Making in the Supreme Court of Canada, 1950-1960,” in Glendon Schubert and
David Danelski (eds.) Comparative Judicial Behavior: Cross-Cultural Studies of Political Decision-Making
in the East and West (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 283.
120 For a detailed discussion of these early methods see, Joseph Tanenhaus, “The Cumulative Scaling of
Judicial Decisions,” Harvard Law Review 79, no. 4 (1966): 1583-1594.
12! Lee Epstein and Carol Mershon, “Measuring Political Preferences,” American Journal of Political
Science 40, no. 1 (1996): 263.
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employed circular reasoning.122 As Brenner and Spaeth note, “one cannot scientifically
demonstrate that attitudes influence the votes when the attitudes are operationalized from
these same votes.”123
To overcome the circularity problem, attitudinal researchers developed measures for
judicial preferences that are independent of the votes they cast. A number of scholars use the
past votes of judges to align them on an ideological scale similar to that developed by
Schubert. Others argue that this approach falls short because attitudes are still being
operationalized from the justices’ votes.124 Nevertheless, researchers have demonstrated that
past votes are “excellent predictors” of future behaviour in certain types of legal disputes.125
As a truly independent measure of ideology, content analysis of materials produced by, or
about, a particular judge, including published works, speeches, and newspaper editorials, has
proven effective.126 Relying on this methodology, Segal and Cover found a robust correlation
of .80 between their measure of attitudes and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in civil
liberties cases.127
Considerable research has been undertaken in recent years on the decision-making
patterns of individual Justices on the Supreme Court of Canada. Although most of this
research is not explicitly designed to test the attitudinal model, some studies have found
evidence in support of its fundamental propositions. In particular, the work of F.L. Morton
and others has focused on the Justices’ attitudes toward different Charter rights and classes of
Charter litigants. They constructed two indices: a “legal rights” index which included only
cases implicating sections 7-14 of the Charter or which involved some other section but
122 Ibid.
123 Brenner and Spaeth, Stare Indecisis. 63.
124 Epstein and Mershon, 264.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
127 Jeffrey A. Segal and Albert Cover, “Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices,”
American Political Science Review 83, no. 2 (1989): 562.
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pertain to a criminal law issue; and a “Court Party” index.128 Morton, Russell and Riddell
used the “Court Party” index to measure the Judges’ support for “Court Party” issues and/or
groups. An index, which is similar to a scale, simply involves accumulating scores that are
assigned to individual attributes.129 Thus, the legal rights index is constructed by tabulating
how often each justice votes in favour of or against a claim involving legal rights.
Using the Justices’ past votes from all applicable Charter cases decided from 1982 to
1992, Morton and others found that the voting behaviour of certain members of the Court
varies considerably from one index to the other. Former Justice L’Heureux-Dube’s decisions
illustrate this point well: she was found to have the second lowest rate of support for Charter
claimants in criminal law cases, and the second highest support rate for the “Court Party.”130
In terms of her ideological position relative to the other Justices, L’Heureux-Dube J. would
be placed on the “left wing” of the Court for the “Court Party” cases, and on the “right wing”
for criminal rights cases.131
In another study designed to test the attitudinal model, the researchers concluded that
Justice L’Heureux-Dube’s opinions reflect a “communitarian orientation” which emphasizes
two broad themes: “(1)... the protection of society from criminal offenders; and (2)... an ethic
of care for groups facing discriminatory treatment or harm.”132 They also determined that
from 1991 to 1995, the Court was dominated by three attitudinal conflicts: communitarianism
versus libertarianism; the due process rights of criminals versus the need to protect society;

128 F.L. Morton, P.H. Russell and T. Riddell, “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: A
Descriptive Analysis of the First Decade, 1982-1992,” National Journal of Constitutional Law 5, no, 1
(1994): 45. The concept of the “Court Party” was developed by Morton and Knopff to describe a “coalition
of minoritarian/ post-materialist interests,” that pursue their policy agendas through Charter litigation.
129 Babbie and Benaquisto, 136.
130 Morton et al, 46. For similar findings, see also, James B. Kelly, “The Charter of Rights and the
Rebalancing of Liberal Constitutionalism in Canada, 1982-1997,” Osgood Hall Law Journal 37, no. 3
(1999): 680.
131 Morton et al, 47.
132 C.L. Ostberg and Matthew Wetstein, “Attitudinal Dimensions of Supreme Court Decision Making in
Canada: The Lamer Court, 1991 - 1995,” Political Research Quarterly 55 (2002): 244.
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and judicial activism versus judicial restraint.133 Taken together, these studies suggest that the
Justices hold various attitudes towards Charter rights. As Andrew Heard argued in 1991, a
consequence of these divergent judicial attitudes, combined with the use of five- and sevenjudge panels, is that the outcome of Charter cases depends in large part on which Justices
hear the appeal.134 However, the use of such panels is much less common today than it was
ten years ago.
Other researchers have examined the connection between the personal attributes of
judges and their voting behaviour. Personal attribute approaches use the background and
demographic characteristics of individual judges to explain past voting behaviour, and to
predict how they will vote in future cases.135 It should be noted that although personal
attribute approaches are considered distinct from the attitudinal model, they share the
assumption that personal attitudes account for judicial behaviour. Background characteristics
are not seen as the cause of judicial decisions, but rather as useful to explaining the formation
of particular attitudes. Variables including gender, race, religion, and education (prestige of
schools) have, in some instances, proven to be highly effective at predicting future
behaviour.136
For example, the personal attribute models developed by Neal Tate were able to
account for a considerable 70 to 90 percent of the variance in the voting behaviour of postwar
U.S. Supreme Court justices in decisions concerning civil rights and liberties, and
economics.137In 1989, Tate and Sittiwong applied the personal attribute model to the
members of the Supreme Court of Canada who sat between 1949 and 1985. They found
133 Ibid.
534 See generally, Andrew Heard, “The Charter in the Supreme Court of Canada: The Importance of Which
Judges Hear an Appeal,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 24, no. 2 (1991): 289-307.
135 Epstein and Knight, 206.
536 See Heise, 834 at note 73.
137 Neal Tate, “Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court Justices:
Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics Decisions, 1956-1978,” American Political Science Review
75, no. 2 (1981): 355-367.
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strong indications that religion, region of origin (especially Quebec/non-Quebec), appointing
prime minister, political affiliation, and length of judicial experience were correlated to the
judge’s voting behaviour in civil rights and liberties and economic cases.138 Other research
has highlighted the distinctive voting behaviour of female Supreme Court Justices in certain
types of cases.139 Most importantly, researchers using attitudinal and personal attribute
models have empirically demonstrated the salience of non-legai factors in the judicial
decision-making process.
In summary, Canadian and American research has convincingly established that
personal attitudes, preferences, and attributes are useful in both predicting and explaining the
voting behaviour of Supreme Court Justices. Notwithstanding problems related to the
empirical tests and measures, Segal explains that, “even critics of the attitudinal model have
conceded its exceptional explanatory ability.”140 Alternatively, the few studies that have
quantitatively examined the propositions of the legal model, have found at best limited
evidence to support the conventional wisdom that precedent influences judicial decision
making. While content analyses have found that judges frequently cite and appeal to
precedent in their opinions, justifying decisions with previous cases is not the same as being
influenced by them.
Notably absent from the existing literature is research examining factors associated
with the legal model, and the influence they may have on the Justices of the Canadian
Supreme Court. The proposed study will attempt to fill the void in the existing body of
literature by comprehensively examining whether precedent (a component of the legal
model) has any influence on the decisions of the Supreme Court Justices. Specifically, the
138 Neal Tate and Panu Sittiwong, “Decision Making in the Canadian Supreme Court: Extending the
Personal Attributes Model across Nations,” Journal of Politics 51, no. 4 (1989): 900-916.
139 See Peter McCormick, “Alliances and Influences on the Lamer Court, 1990 - 1997,” O sgoodeH all Law
Journal 36 (1998): 359.
140 Segal, 33.
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research will be undertaken in three stages: a content analysis of the Court’s written opinions;
application of the methodology used by Brenner and Spaeth to test the influence of precedent
in cases which alter precedent; and application of Segal and Spaeth’s methodology for
measuring precedential influence.
4. Hypotheses
Based on the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence and the findings of previous
research, the study hypothesizes:

1. Supreme Court Justices will invoke arguments based on precedent more
than arguments from other sources in their written opinions.
2a. The majority of Supreme Court Justices will exhibit low levels of support for
“institutional” stare decisis (33 percent or less), and moderate to high levels of
support for “personal” stare decisis (34 percent and above).
2b. The Court as a whole will exhibit a low level of support for “institutional” stare
decisis (33 percent or less), and moderate to high levels of support for “personal”
stare decisis (34 percent and above).
3a. The majority of Supreme Court Justices will exhibit weak levels of “precedential
behaviour” (33 percent or less), and strong levels of “preferential behaviour” (68
percent and above).
3b. The Court as a whole will exhibit a weak level of “precedential behaviour” (33
percent or less), and a strong level of “preferential behaviour” (68 percent and
above).141

141 The cut-off points are the same as used in Segal and Spaeth. Majority Rule. 2 1 - 2 2 .
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CHAPTER 3
Methodology
1. Content Analysis
The first hypothesis is that file Court will frequently invoke arguments from
precedent in its opinions, relative to arguments from other sources. To test this expectation, a
content analysis will be conducted of the Court’s published opinions from the 2004 term.1
Similar to the approach used by Phelps and Gates, each paragraph of an opinion will be a
separate unit of observation.2 The name of the Justice who wrote each opinion will be
recorded, as well as whether the opinion was written for the majority, concurring with the
majority, or dissenting.
Each paragraph from those opinions is then assigned to one of nine straightforward
categories, seven of which represent a different “mode of argument.”3 In justifying their
decisions, judges employ various “modes of argument” such as precedent and scholarly
materials. Presumably, each paragraph will contain one “mode of argument.” Paragraphs will
be classified according to whether the argument is based on: statutory/constitutional text,
legislative materials, precedent, scholarly materials, intervener submissions, social science
evidence, or “higher law” sources. Note that the first three “modes” are aspects of the legal
model, while some of the remaining categories comport with the features of the attitudinal
model. Thus, it is also possible to combine the variables associated with the legal model and
calculate the frequency of arguments based on legal rules.

1 The cases will be obtained from the Supreme Court’s online database at, http://lexum.umontreal.ca/cscscc/en.html.
2 Glenn A. Phelps and John G. Gates, “The Myth of Jurisprudence: Interpretive Theory in the
Constitutional Opinions of Justices Rehnquist and Brennan,” Santa Clara Law Review 31, no. 2 (1991):
586. As the authors explain, based on the conventions of English usage, a paragraph “should be
thematically unified and express one central idea.” As such, each paragraph should contain only one
primary “mode of argument.”
3 Ibid., 587.
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Textual arguments are those based on the specific language of an international treaty,
or constitutional/statutory provision. References to the Interpretation Act, which provides
guidance to the courts regarding the interpretation of statutes, are classified as textual
arguments.4 The category also includes references to dictionaries since they are used to assist
in determining the meaning of a text.
Arguments based on legislative materials are those which rely on statements made by
legislators during debates, and committee reports. They are usually used by the Court to
ascertain the purpose or intent of a constitutional/statutory provision. Although the Supreme
Court has warned that such materials should be given “minimal weight” in the context of
Charter interpretation, the Court continues to consult legislative materials in its statutory
jurisprudence and occasionally in Charter cases.5
Arguments based on precedent include any instance in which the Court uses case law:
its own decisions, those of federal and provincial courts, and/or the decisions of foreign
courts. However, the precedent category does not include paragraphs discussing the judicial
history of the particular case that the Supreme Court is considering.
A category has been created for arguments based on scholarly materials such as
textbooks and periodicals. Until relatively recently, the Supreme Court followed a policy
which discouraged referencing living authors.6 However, today scholarly materials are
regularly used by the Justices to support their decisions.
Conversely, “higher law” arguments invoke principles that, while not necessarily
derived from textual sources, are considered implicit in the structure or history of the
Canadian legal system. Moreover, appealing to the concept of “natural justice,” or natural
4 Canadian Legal Information Institute, Interpretation Act. R.S. 1985, c. 1-23, s. 1, online, available from
http.//www. canlii.org/ca/sta/i-21.
5 Ref. Re. s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, par. 52.
6 Peter McCormick, “The Judges and the Journals: Citation of Periodical Literature by the Supreme Court
of Canada, 1985 - 2004,” The Canadian Bar Review 83 (2004): 636.
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law, is an example of an argument based on a “higher law” source.7 An excellent example of
the use of “higher law” sources occurred in Re Secession o f Quebec, where the Court’s
decision-making was guided by certain “underlying constitutional principles: federalism,
democracy, constitutionalism, the rule of law, and respect for minority rights.”8 Finally, the
use of constitutional values to justify a non-constitutional decision is considered a “higher
law” source.
An additional category has been included to classify paragraphs that discuss the facts
of a case and its litigation history.9 It also includes paragraphs that simply state the questions
raised by the appeal. A category was also created for paragraphs that do not fit into one of the
other modes of argument. Furthermore, because most cases raise more than one issue, the
analysis will indicate whether the “object” of the mode of argument within each paragraph is
constitutional, statutory, or other.
Based on the results of the content analysis, it will be possible to identify the mode of
argument which the Justices employ most frequently in their opinions. Moreover, the data
will be examined to determine whether any relationships can be detected between judges and
“modes of argument,” and between “mode of argument” and case type. The results are
expected to show that the Court employs arguments from precedent with greater frequency
than any other source.
2.1 The Characteristics of Precedent Altering Decisions
The second stage of the research examines the influence of precedent on the votes of
the Justices on the Supreme Court of Canada in cases which alter precedent. It will be
divided into two parts , the first describes the characteristics of precedents altered by the

7 For a discussion of “higher law” sources see, Charles Epp, “Do Bills of Rights Matter? The Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms,” American Political Science Review 90, no. 4 (1996): 773.
8 Ref. Re. Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, par. 49.
9 Phelps and Gates, 578.
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Supreme Court since 1950; the second part assesses the influence of precedent on the votes
of the Justices in cases that alter precedent. The choice to use cases which “alter” rather than
“overrule” precedent was made to ensure an adequate sample size. As noted earlier, the
Supreme Court rarely issues decisions that explicitly overrule a precedent. Consequently,
using only cases that formally overrule a precedent would severely limit the number of cases
included in the sample.
Part one requires compiling a list of cases in which the Court has altered its own
precedents or those established by the JCPC or House of Lords. Although the Court
frequently “alters” the direction of the law in a particular area, this study is concerned only
with cases which substantially alter a principle or rule of law articulated in a previous
decision. Identification of precedent-altering decisions relies primarily on a statement in the
Court’s majority or plurality opinion that the decision alters one or more precedents.10 This
should reduce the subjectivity involved in determining what constitutes a precedent-altering
decision.
There are a number of ways that the Court can alter precedent. The clearest example
of altering precedent occurs when the Court overrules a prior decision. In some cases the
Court will clearly indicate that it is overruling a precedent in the section near the beginning of
each judgment titled “cases cited.”11 However, there are examples of the Court overruling a
precedent without acknowledging it under the “cases cited” heading.12 In some instances, the
Court overrules a precedent but does not explicitly admit to it until a subsequent decision.

10 Saul Brenner and Harold Spaeth. Stare Indecisis: The Alteration of Precedent on the Supreme Court.
1946 -1 9 9 2 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 19. [hereinafter Brenner and Spaeth, Stare
Indecisis!
11 For example, see Wells v. Newfoundland [1999] 3 S.C.R. 199.
12 In U.S. v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, the Court overruled its decisions in Kindler v. Canada, [1991] 2
S.C.R. 779 and Ref. Re Ng, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 858. However, these cases were listed under the “cases cited”
heading as “explained” rather than “overruled.”
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Sometimes the Court will list a precedent as “not followed,” or “distinguished,”
which alone is not enough to be classified as a precedent altering decision. To be considered
precedent-altering, the Court must say that a precedent has not been followed or
distinguished, accompanied by a statement to the effect of, “this decision is no longer good
law,” or “can no longer be regarded as controlling.”13 The Court can also alter precedent by
refusing to apply the majority judgment from an earlier decision. In addition to reading the
Court’s decisions, scholarly materials, including textbooks and periodical literature, will be
used to aid in the identification of precedent-altering decisions. While the list of altering and
altered precedents does not purport to be exhaustive, it does provide a fairly comprehensive
picture of how the members of the Supreme Court approach the doctrine of stare decisis in
their precedent-altering judgments.
The characteristics of the altering and altered precedents are then entered into an
SPSS database. Each decision is identified in the database by name, citation, and year as
listed in the Supreme Court Reports or the Dominion Law Reports. For each precedent
altering decision, the presiding Chief Justice is recorded. Specifically, they are given a value
from one to nine, which represent all of the Chief Justices that have served since 1950. The
values are as follows: (1) Rinffet; (2) Kerwin; (3) Taschereau; (4) Cartwright; (5) Fauteux;
(6) Laskin; (7) Dickson; (8) Lamer; (9) McLachlin.
The votes from the precedent-altering decisions are coded into one of three categories
which represent different levels of agreement among die Justices. The “high level of
agreement” category includes unanimous (or eight-to-one) decisions to alter precedent.14
Justices express “moderate levels of agreement” in decisions decided by votes of: seven-to-

13 In Bell v. The Queen, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 212, the Court stated that it was “no longer bound by the decision
in City of Toronto v. Polai, [1973] S.C.R. 38,” even though the decision was listed as “distinguished” in the
“cases cited” section of the judgment.
14 Brenner and Spaeth, Stare Indecisis. 32.
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one, seven-to-two, six-to-one, six-to-two, five-to-one, and five-to-two.15 Alternatively, a low
level of agreement occurs when the vote is five-to-four, five-to-three, six-to-three, and threeto-two.16 Moreover, the court that decided the altered precedent is coded as either: (1) the
Supreme Court of Canada; or (2) English Court, which includes the JCPC, House of Lords,
and the English Courts of Appeal. Precedents established by lower or foreign courts other
than the “high courts” of England are omitted since the Supreme Court is not, and has never
been, “bound” to follow them.
The Chief Justice at the time the altered precedent was decided is recorded. Although
the list of Chief Justices for the precedent-altering decisions only includes those who have
served since 1950, the list for the altered decisions includes every Chief Justice since the
Court was founded in 1875. The values for Chief Justice are as follows: (1) Richards; (2)
Ritchie; (3) Strong; (4) Taschereau; (5) Fitzpatrick; (6) Davies; (7) Anglin; (8) Duff; (9)
Rinfret; (10) Kerwin; (11) R. Taschereau; (12) Cartwright; (13) Fauteux; (14) Laskin; (15)
Dickson; (16) Lamer; (17) McLachlin. An additional value of 18 (“not applicable”) was
added to account for altered English court precedents.
The altered precedents were further organized according to age. Altered precedents
are placed into one of five age-ranges. The first category includes all decisions that are less
than ten years old; the second includes decisions eleven to twenty years old; category three is
for decisions between twenty-one and thirty years of age; the fourth category includes
judgments that are thirty-one to forty years old; and the fifth category includes decisions
forty-one years and older. Moreover, the actual age of the altered precedents is recorded.
Finally, the Court’s stated reason for altering the precedent is recorded into one of ten
categories. Most of the categories correspond to the reasons for altering precedent identified

15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., 33.
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by the Supreme Court in Bernard' 1,Chaulkn , B. (K.G.)19, and Robinson20. While the Court
frequently offers more than one justification for altering a precedent, this study is concerned
with identifying the single most salient reason. Determining what constitutes the “most
salient reason” involves selecting the one reason emphasized and relied on most heavily by
the Court in justifying the alteration of precedent. In other words, the researcher must ask,
“would the court have altered precedent in the absence of the particular reason?” If the likely
answer is “no,” the reason may be considered the “most salient.”
The reasons for altering precedent are as follows: (1) the Court is no longer bound by
the decisions of the JCPC; (2) the introduction of the Charter requires the Court to alter its
jurisprudence in certain areas; (3) Parliament has enacted a law in response to a common law
or statutory precedent; (4) a particular area of law or doctrine needs to be updated; (5) the
altered precedent was wrongly decided; (6) the altered precedent was “unworkable” or
created uncertainty for lower courts and others to which it applied; (7) the altered decision
has been attenuated by subsequent Supreme Court decisions; (8) the altered decision has the
effect of expanding criminal liability; (9) the altered decision has been the subject of
scholarly criticism. An additional category, “(10) other,” has been included for reasons which
do not fit into to one of the nine categories.
Based on these data, it will be possible to empirically examine and describe the
characteristics of altering and altered Supreme Court decisions. Specifically, the data will
reveal whether there are any patterns or trends in how the Court alters precedent. Part two of
Section two uses the list of altering and altered decisions to test the influence of precedent on
the Justices’ votes in cases which alter precedent. It follows a methodology similar to that

17 R. v. Bernard, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 833.
18 R. v. Chaulk, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303.
19 R. v. B. (K.G.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 740.
20 R. v. Robinson, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 683.
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used by Brenner and Spaeth in their examination of the influence of precedent on the U.S.
Supreme Court in cases which overrule precedent.
2.2 The Influence of Stare Decisis in Precedent Altering Decisions
To test the influence of precedent as an aspect of the legal model, the present
examination assumes that a vote to alter precedent conflicts with the legal model.21 Although
some nonconformity is permissible under a “lax” version of the doctrine of precedent,
Brenner and Spaeth explain that such deviations are “considered unusual, and defenders of
the legal model do not present explicit guidelines about when it is appropriate to abandon
stare decisis.”22 The units of analysis are the votes of Justices that participated in both the
altered and altering decisions.
Furthermore, testing the influence of precedent requires distinguishing between
“institutional” and “personal” stare decisis. The former takes place when a Justice
“conforms” to the Court’s precedents; the latter occurs when a Justice votes consistently with
his or her past votes. The legal model demands adherence to “institutional” stare decisis,
whereas the strategic model expects the “personal” form to dominate. However, it should be
noted that adherence to “personal” stare decisis may indicate that a justice is voting based on
a set of personal attitudes toward the issues raised, which would be consistent with the
attitudinal model. According to these criteria, four possible voting patterns may emerge:
1. A justice may vote with the majority in the altered case and dissent in the altering
decision. This voting behaviour is consistent with both “institutional” and
“personal” stare decisis.
2. A justice may dissent in the altered case and vote with the majority in the altering
decision. This behaviour conforms to “personal” stare decisis while rejecting
“institutional” stare decisis.
3. A justice may vote with the majority in the altered and altering cases. This
behaviour conforms to neither “institutional” nor “personal” stare decisis.

21 Brenner and Spaeth, Stare Indecisis. 73.
22

t u ’ -i
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4. A justice may dissent in both the altered and altering decisions. This behaviour
conforms to “institutional” stare decisis, but not to “personal” stare decisis 23
To determine the influence of “institutional” stare decisis on the individual justices
and the Court as a whole, I divide the total number of votes compatible with the legal model
by the number of pairs of altered and altering decisions. Each pair of decisions (i.e. the
altered and altering) which a justice participates count as one. Thus, if justice A participates
in two pairs of decisions and votes to oppose the alteration of precedent in one pair, he or she
voted compatibly with the legal model 50 percent of the time. The same formula is used to
calculate the level of support for “personal” stare decisis. Scores between 0 and 33 percent
correspond to a low level of support for either “institutional” or “personal” stare decisis.
Moderate support occurs between 34 and 67 percent, while a score of 68-100 percent
represents a high level of support.
3. The Influence of Stare Decisis in all Cases since 1950
The third stage of the research will assess whether precedent actually influences the
decisions of the Justices on the Supreme Court. Specifically, it is hypothesized that the
Justices will demonstrate a weak level of “precedential behaviour.” In order to test this
prediction, Segal and Spaeth’s methodology will be applied to the Supreme Court of Canada.
Precedential influence will be measured by focusing on Justices who opposed the
establishment of a precedent. Since their “original preferences” conflict with the precedent,
Spaeth and Segal argue that if they subsequently support the precedent, a “strong
assumption” can be made that the established precedent influenced their vote.24
Sampling for this type of analysis raises a number of practical issues. In compiling
their list of precedent setting cases and “progeny,” Segal and Spaeth had the benefit of using

T
24 Harold Spaeth and Jeffrey Segal, Majority Rule or Minority Will: Adherence to Precedent on the U.S.
I b i d -

Supreme Court (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 23. [hereinafter Spaeth and Segal,
Majority Rulel
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previously compiled data supplemented by information from legal indices. The present
research will use the Supreme Court Reports to identify the non-unanimous precedent setting
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada. However, identifying progeny —“decisions
subsequent to the precedent whose issue(s) and factual circumstances closely resemble those
of the precedent itself”— requires the researcher to carefully read and group the progeny
cases with the applicable precedent.25 To aid in this process, scholarly writings, including law
review articles and legal texts, will be consulted.
Furthermore, to ensure an adequate sample size, while also keeping the research
manageable, this study will include only those precedent-setting cases and progeny decided
since 1949. The selection of 1949 as the cut-off point is logical, because in that year appeals
to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council were abolished and the Supreme Court of
Canada became the nation’s principal judicial authority.
As previously noted, this study will use Spaeth and Segal’s operational definition of
“precedential influence,” which is “the extent to which justices who disagree with a
precedent move toward that position in subsequent cases.”26 The dissenting vote in the
precedent-setting case is considered the judge’s “revealed preference;” subsequent votes in
progeny cases that are consistent with the original vote to dissent are recorded as
“preferential.” In other words, the judge continues to vote according to his or her preferences.
Conversely, if a judge who dissents from a precedent subsequently changes their vote in a
progeny of that precedent, the behaviour is recorded as “precedential.”
Although vote switching by the Justices of the Supreme Court is a relatively
uncommon occurrence, it has been known to happen. For example, during the 1987 Term,
Justice Estey dissented in the first of a series of cases dealing with the application of section

25 Ibid., 25.
26 Ibid., 5.
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11 of the Charter, but agreed with the majority in the remaining three. In Wigglesworth, Estey
J. dissented from the majority, arguing that section 11(h) of the Charter applied to police
disciplinary hearings.27 However, he sided with the majority in three progeny cases which
were explicitly based on the majority’s reasoning in Wigglesworth.2* Thus, under Spaeth and
Segal’s coding conventions, Justice Estey’s votes in the Wigglesworth progeny are
considered precedential; that is, his subsequent votes conform to established precedents
rather than his original revealed preferences.
As Spaeth and Segal note, there are different levels, or “manifestations” of
precedential and preferential behaviour, “that might properly be considered an ordinal
scale.”29 Specifically, they divide precedential behaviour into three exclusive categories:
weak, moderate, and strong. “Strong precedential” behaviour occurs when a judge “formally
accedes” to the precedent in a written opinion.30 “Moderate precedential” behaviour occurs
when a judge joins or writes an opinion that “specifically supports and cites” the precedent as
an authority for their vote.31 Justice Estey’s vote for the majority opinion in Trumbley, which
explicitly cites Wigglesworth, is an excellent illustration of “moderate precedential”
behaviour. A dissenting judge can also accede to a precedent without saying so, by voting in
a progeny compatibly with the (ideological) direction of the decision in the precedent, which
is defined as “weak precedential behaviour.”32
There are also varying levels of preferential behaviour, which takes place when a
judge continues to dissent in progeny cases. “Weak preferential” behaviour occurs when a

27 See R. v. Wigglesworth, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 541.
28 Burnham v. Metropolitan Toronto Police, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 572; Trumbley and Pugh v. Metropolitan
Toronto Police, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 577; Trimm v. Durham Regional Police, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 582; see also,
Heard, 296.
29 Spaeth and Segal, Majority Rule. 35.
30 Ibid., 35.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., 36.
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dissenter joins or writes an opinion opposite in direction from that of the precedent.33 For
example, a vote against a criminal rights claim is considered “conservative.” If the judge
continues to oppose similar criminal rights claims, without referring to his or her dissent in
the original case, the judges’ votes are consistent with “weak preferential” behaviour.
“Moderate preferential” justices will support their original position by dissenting from, or
concurring with the opinion in a progeny that cites the precedent as authority.34 Conversely,
“strong preferential” judges continue to oppose the precedent, by either explicitly saying so,
or by citing their dissent from the precedent as an authority.35
For each dissenting judge, the number of preferential and precedential votes in
progeny cases are totalled, and assigned to one of the six aforementioned categories
representing degrees of precedential and preferential behaviour. Dividing the votes in the
“strong,” “moderate,” and “weak” precedential categories by the judge’s total number of
precedential votes, produces a percentage total for each category. The same process is
repeated for the preferential voting categories, as well as for all of the judges’ votes
combined.
To determine the overall level of precedential support for each judge and the Court as
a whole, Spaeth and Segal’s “cut-off points” will be used. On this scale, 0-33 percent is
considered a weak level of precedential support, 34-67 percent is moderate, and 68-100
percent is a strong level.36 Thus, a score of 30% means that the judge, or Court, exhibits a
weak level of precedential behaviour. In other words, precedent has very little influence. This
result would be consistent with the attitudinal model, whereas a score of 75% would be
consistent with the legal model.

33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., 37.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., 21-22.
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CHAPTER 4
Results and Discussion
The first stage of the current research is based on a content analysis of the published
judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada from 2004. All of the judgments reported on the
Supreme Court’s website for that year were included.1This results in a sample of eighty-two
cases; however, two cases were excluded because the reasons for judgment were not reported
on the Court’s website.2 Some of the more noteworthy decisions from that year include a case
dealing with the right of parents to physically discipline their children (also known as the
“spanking case”)3, a decision relating to the Air India bombing,4 and the same-sex marriage
reference.5
The 80 cases produced a total of 5112 paragraphs, for an average of 63.9 paragraphs
per opinion. Not surprisingly, the aforementioned “spanking case,” which is perhaps the most
divisive case the Court dealt with in 2004, produced the most paragraphs at 246. Four
judgments tied for having the fewest number of paragraphs at 1. In terms of the opinion type,
4001 (78.3 percent) of the paragraphs were part of majority opinions, 105 paragraphs (2.1
percent) were part of concurring opinions, and 696 (13.6 percent) were part of dissenting
opinions. In addition, 41 paragraphs (.8 percent) were classified as partial concurrences, and
269 paragraphs (5.3 percent) were partial dissents.

1 See Appendix A for the list of cases used in the content analysis.
2 The excluded cases are R. v. Deschamplain, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 601, 2004 SCC 76; and R. v. Sazant, [2004]
3 S.C.R. 635, 2004 SCC77.
3 Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (A.G.), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76.
4 Re. Application under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 248; Re. Vancouver Sun, [2004] 2
S.C.R. 332.
5 Ref. Re. Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698.
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Table 4.1
Paragraph Author Frequency
Justice
McLachlin
Gonthier
Major
Bastarache
Binnie
LeBel
Deschamps
Arbour
Fish
lacobucci
Charron
The Court
Total

Frequency
613
76
382
540
1002
705
432
307
533
430
8
84
5112

Percent
(%)
12.0
1.5
7.5
10.6
19.6
13.8
8.5
6.0
10.4
8.4
.2
1.6
100.0

Table 4.1 presents the number of paragraphs authored by each of the eleven Justices
who participated during 2004, as well as a category for those opinions signed by “The
Court.” Five of the Justices combined to author approximately two-thirds of all the
paragraphs. As Table 4.1 shows, Justice Binnie authored 1002 paragraphs (19.6 percent),
which was more than any other member of the Court in 2004. Justice LeBel authored the
second highest number of paragraphs at 705 which represents 13.8 percent of all the
paragraphs included in the sample. Chief Justice McLachlin was third with 613 paragraphs
(12 percent), followed by Justices Bastarache and Fish, who authored 540 (10.6 percent) and
533 (10.4 percent) paragraphs respectively. Justice Charron, one of the newest members of
the Court, authored the least number of paragraphs, with 8 or .2 percent of the total number
of paragraphs from 2004.
Justice Binnie authored the greatest number of majority opinion paragraphs with 796.
The Chief Justice is second at 568 majority paragraphs, followed by Justice Fish with 431
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and Justice Iacobucci with 430. Justice LeBel authored 53 concurring paragraphs and 159
dissenting paragraphs which is more than any other Justice in either category. The second
most frequent dissenter measured by number of paragraphs is Justice Bastarache at 152,
while Justice Binnie was third with 135 dissenting paragraphs.
Table 4.2 presents the seven modes of argument and the number of times the Court
invoked each in its judgments from 2004. It shows that slightly more than one-quarter (27
percent) of all paragraphs were devoted to explaining the background and litigation history of
the cases. This is to be expected, as the case facts are regarded as important by all three of the
models of judicial decision-making discussed in Chapter Two. An additional 26.1 percent of
the paragraphs were classified as “Other,” meaning that they did not rely on any of the modes
of argument included in the analysis. Most of the paragraphs coded as “Other” were either
instances in which the author applied die law to the facts of the case being considered,
addressed an argument raised by another Justice in the same case, or paragraphs containing
the disposition of the case.

Table 4.2
Frequency of Mode of Argumen:
Mode of Argument
Case Background
Constitutional/Statutory Text
Legislative Materials
Precedent
Scholarly Materials
Briefs
Social Science
Higher Law Sources
Other
Total

Frequency
1380

Percent
27.0

834

16.3

63
1283
161
10
26
21
1334
5112

1.2
25.1
3.1
.2
.5
.4
26.1
100.0
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The data in Table 4.2 confirm the initial hypothesis that the Court invokes arguments
based on precedent more frequently than any other source. Specifically, the Court referred to
precedents in 1283 paragraphs, which represents 25.1 percent of the total number of
paragraphs. The next most frequently used mode of argument are those based on die wording
of statutory and constitutional texts. The Court relied on arguments from textual sources in
834 (16.3 percent) of the paragraphs. The Court referred to scholarly materials in 161
paragraphs, which represents 3.1 percent of the total number of paragraphs. Legislative
materials such as Parliamentary debates and committee reports were used by the Court in 1.2
percent of the paragraphs, followed by social science evidence at .5 percent, higher law
sources at .4 percent, and briefs were the least used mode of argument at .2 percent.
Considered alone, the Court’s use of precedent to justify its decisions suggests that
legal factors are an important part of judicial decision-making. However, the salience of legal
factors appears even greater when the variables associated with the legal model are combined
and compared to the variables associated with the attitudinal model. The three variables
(modes of argument) associated with the legal model are constitutional/statutory texts,
legislative materials, and precedent. The Court referred to variables associated with the legal
model in 2180 paragraphs, which, as the pie chart in Figure 4.A illustrates, represents 42.6
percent of the total number of paragraphs. When combined, the variables associated with the
attitudinal model, including scholarly materials, briefs, social science evidence, and higher
law sources, were invoked in a mere 218 or 4.3 percent of the paragraphs.
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Figure 4. A
Comparison of Combined Legal and Attitudinal Variables

Legal Model
Variables

42.6%

Other
Variables |

53.1%

Attitudinal
Model
Variables

4.3%

A cross tabulation between the various modes of argument and case types was
also conducted. It reveals that almost half (49.4 percent) of the 1283 paragraphs which
rely on precedent were from statutory cases, while 37.9 percent came in constitutional
cases, and the remaining 12.7 percent were from “Other” types of cases such as those
involving common law rules. Moreover, 80.8 percent of all arguments based on social
science evidence occurred in constitutional cases, compared to 19.2 percent in statutory
cases. Finally, 71.4 percent of all arguments based on higher law sources came in
constitutional cases. It is clear from this that the Court relies on different types of
arguments depending on the type of case it is deciding. Specifically, in 2004 the Justices
were more likely to use briefs, social science evidence, and higher law sources to justify
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their constitutional decisions, whereas textual sources, legislative materials, and
precedent were the preferred justificatory devices in statutory cases.
Thus, the content analysis has substantiated the initial hypothesis that precedent
specifically, and variables associated with the legal model generally, were used by the
Court more than any other mode of argument to justify its decisions in 2004. However, it
should be stated that these results are not necessarily generalizable to other years or
applicable to other courts. The results simply demonstrate that precedent was the most
frequently used mode o f argument by the Supreme Court in 2004. Moreover, although
the findings o f the analysis parallel the results of previous research conducted in Canada
and the U.S., they are subject to changes in the Court’s personnel and agenda. Different
judges use different modes of argument to justify their decisions. Furthermore, changes in
the subject matter o f the Court’s agenda may result in the use o f alternative modes of
argument. For example, based on the present analysis it is reasonable to hypothesize that
an increase in the number o f statutory cases that the Court decides in a given term is
likely to produce a concomitant increase in the use of textual sources by the Justices.
Perhaps more importantly, the results of this study do not prove that precedent
influences the way in which the Justices decide cases. As the attitudinalists and realists
have noted, factors such as precedent are used by judges to conceal their personal
preferences which are the actual basis for their decisions. Despite these shortcomings, the
forgoing analysis has been employed primarily to establish the salience of precedent, and
the legal model, in the content of judicial opinions. The remaining sections of the current
research will specifically examine the influence of precedent on judicial behaviour.
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Having established the prominence of precedent in the Supreme Court’s opinions, the
second section of the research examines the influence of stare decisis in cases which alter
precedent since 1950. It is divided into two parts: die first analyzes the characteristics of
altering and altered decisions; the second explores the influence of precedent on the votes of
the Justices in precedent altering cases.
An examination o f the Supreme Court’s published judgments since 1950, as well
as academic literature, resulted in a list of 45 decisions which alter 61 precedents. The list
of precedent altering-decisions along with the decisions that were altered appears in
Appendix B. It also includes the “method of alteration,” which is the specific language used
by the Court in the “cases cited” section, such as “overruled” or “not followed,” as well as
the primary reason for altering the precedent.
The first precedent altering decision occurred in 1961; the most recent was in 2004.
In 1985, the Court altered precedent in five cases, which is more than in any other year. The
Court altered four precedents in 1987 and 1999, which was the second most in a single year.
Between 1950 and 1984, the Court altered precedent in 12 cases. From 1985 to the present,
the Court altered precedent on 33 occasions. The increased frequency of alterations since
1985 is consistent with the hypothesis that the Charter provided the Court with a mandate to
alter its previous jurisprudence.
Chief Justice Dickson presided over the most alterations of precedent, 22 (36.1
percent), followed by Lamer with 17 (27.9 percent). Brian Dickson was appointed as Chief
Justice in 1984, shortly after the first Charter case made its way onto the Court’s docket. In
1990, Antonio Lamer was elevated to the position of Chief Justice. Together, Dickson and
Lamer presided over more alterations of precedent than all of the other Chief Justices since
1950 combined. It is no coincidence that they were also the first two Chief Justices of the
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Charter era during which Canadian law underwent significant doctrinal changes. Conversely,
under the leadership of BoraLaskin, there were 13 (21.3 percent) precedent altering
decisions. The current Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin has presided over 5 (8.2 percent)
alterations of precedent, followed by Kerwin and Fauteux with 2 (3.3 percent) each.
In the majority of their precedent-altering decisions (75 .4 percent), the Justices
exhibited a high level of agreement. Determining the level of agreement was not a simple as
counting the number of Justices in the majority and minority. For instance, in R. v. Burke,
Justices McLachlin, L’Heureux-Dube, Gonthier, and Bastarache dissented as to the outcome
of the case, but agreed with the majority that the rule established in R. v. Head relating to the
ability of a judge to reconvene a jury after it has been discharged should be altered.6 In
contrast, moderate levels of agreement appeared in 8.2 percent of the Court’s precedentaltering decisions, while 16.4 percent were altered with a low level of agreement. The data
clearly indicate that when the Court decides to alter precedent, it has generally done so with a
high level of agreement among die participating Justices.
The altered precedents vary in age from 2 years to 109, for an average of 30.21 years.
When placed into an age-range categories, 31.1 percent of altered decisions are forty-one
years or older, 4.9 percent are thirty-one to forty years old, 11.5 percent are twenty-one to
thirty, 27.9 percent are eleven to twenty, and the remaining 24.6 percent are ten years old or
less. Fifty-three of the altered precedents (86 .9 percent) were decisions of the Supreme Court
of Canada, while the remaining 8(13.1 percent) were decisions of the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council or some other English court of appeal. Interestingly, the Court exhibited a
high level of agreement in all of the decisions that altered an English precedent.

6 R. v. Burke. 120021 2 S.C.R.
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Table 4.3
Cross tabulation of the Level of Agreement and Aee of Altered Deeisk'
_________
Age of Altered
Decision

Level
Low Level of
Agreement

of Agreement______________________

Moderate Level
of Agreement

High Level of
Agreement

Total

0-to-10

3 (20.0%)

3 (20.0%)

9 (60.0%)

15(100.0%)

11 -to-20

7 (38.9%)

1 (5.6%)

10(55.6% )

18(100.0% )

21-to-30

0 (.0%)

0 (.0%)

6 (100.0%)

6(100.0% )

31-to-40

0 (.0%)

1 (33.3%)

2 (66.7%)

3 (100.0%)

41 and older

0 (.0%)

0 (.0%)

19 (100.0%)

10 (16.4%)

5 (8.2%)

46 (75.4%)

Total

19(100.0%)

61 (100%)

In addition, the data indicate the possibility of a relationship between the level of
agreement among the Justices in cases that alter precedent and the age of the altered
precedent. In particular, Table 4.3 presents a cross tabulation of the level of agreement and
the ages of altered precedents, and shows, inter alia, that 100 percent of the altered
precedents forty-one years or older were altered with a high level of agreement. In their
study, Brenner and Spaeth hypothesized that “older precedents would tend to be overruled by
a unanimous or nearly unanimous vote, while newer precedents would tend to be overruled
by a minimum winning or close vote.”7 This was based on the belief that judges have less
attachment or loyalty to older decisions, at least in part because they likely did not participate
in the older decision. However, it could also mean that the precedent simply outlived its
usefulness.

7 Saul Brenner and Harold J. Spaeth, Stare Indecisis: The Alteration of Precedent on the Supreme Court.
1946 - 1992 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 32.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

76
Although it may seem reasonable, based on the data in Table 4.3, to conclude that
Brenner and Spaeth’s hypothesis holds true for the Supreme Court of Canada, there are
reasons to question the validity of that position. Specifically, the majority of decisions in each
of the age-range categories were altered with a high level of agreement among the Justices.
Moreover, 100 percent of the altered precedents between the ages of twenty-one and thirty
were altered with high levels of agreement. Low levels of agreement were found in only 10
of the total 61 altered precedents (16.4 percent). The highest proportion of decisions altered
by low levels of agreement fell into the 1l-to-20 age-range category. Thus, while not
completely negating the possibility of a connection between age and level of agreement, the
prevalence of high levels of agreement in all age-range categories substantially diminishes
the significance of any association.
The reasons for altering precedent are presented in Table 4.4. It shows that the largest
proportion of alterations, 31.1 percent, occurred because the Justices felt that the precedent
was wrongly decided. For example, in Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta, the Court
overturned a five-year old precedent pertaining to adverse effects discrimination and the duty
of employers to accommodate their employees, conceding that, “the majority of this Court
may have indeed erred” in the original precedent.8
The need to update the law in a particular area was offered as the primary reason
given by the Court for altering precedent in 19.7 percent of the cases, especially those
involving common law rules and doctrines. A prime example of this type of alteration is the
case of Hamstra v. B.C. Rugby Union9 Hamstra was rendered quadriplegic in a rugby match
organized by the B.C. Ruby Union. He subsequently initiated an action claiming negligence

8 Central Alberta Daily Pool v. Alberta, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 489, par. 51
s Hamstra v. B.C. Rugby Union, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 1092. [hereinafter Hamstra]
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on the part of the Rugby Union. During the trial, several witnesses made reference to the
possibility that the Rugby Union was insured.
Table 4.4
Basis for Altering Precedent
Basis for Altering
Precedent
The Charter
Need to update
law
Decision was
wrong
Decision
unworkablecreated
uncertainty
Decision
attenuated by
other cases
Expands criminal
liability
Total

Frequency

Percent

12

19.7

12

19.7

19

31.1

0

9.8

11

18.0

1

1.6

61

100.0

Believing that the references could be prejudicial to their defence, the Rugby Union
brought a motion seeking to have the jury discharged, which the trial judge granted. The trial
judge’s decision to discharge the jury rested on the common law rule articulated by die
Supreme Court in Bowhey v. Theakston, that a “jury should be discharged automatically if
something occurs from which the jury might reasonably infer that the defendant is insured.”10
In Hamstra, the Supreme Court unanimously overruled Theakston, arguing that the rule was
outdated since the prevalence of insurance in society today is widely known.11
Since the mid-1980s, the Court has altered 12 precedents (19.7 percent) because of
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. One of the first cases in which the Charter required the
Court to alter a precedent was II v. Big M Drug Mart.12 At issue in Big M was whether the
federal Lord’s Day Act, which prohibited certain forms of work and business activity on
10 Bowhey v. Theakston, [1951] S.C.R. 679.
11 Hamstra, 1094.
12 R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295.
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Sundays, infringed the right to freedom of conscience and religion as guaranteed by section
2(a) of the Charter. In addition to finding the Lord’s Day Act unconstitutional, the Court
refused to follow its decision in Robertson and Rosetanni, a case from 1963 in which the Act
was upheld in a challenge based on the Bill of Rights. Justice Dickson, who authored the
majority opinion in Big M, explicitly rejected the narrow meaning of “freedom of religion”
espoused by the majority in Robertson and Rosetanni.13
According to the majority in Robertson and Rosentanni, the Bill of Rights was “not
concerned with ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms’ in any abstract sense, but rather
with such ‘rights and freedoms’ as they existed in Canada immediately before the statute was
enacted.”14 Professor Manfredi argues that the reasoning in Robertson and Rosetanni is
grounded in a “discredited ‘frozen concepts’ theory of rights,” under which rights and
freedoms are construed narrowly rendering them incapable of growth and development.15
The Court’s decision in B igM is significant because it stands for the proposition that rights
and freedoms under the Charter should be generously interpreted.16 Furthermore, the case
provides an excellent illustration of the Charter requiring the Court to update and alter its
jurisprudence.
The Court altered 11 precedents (18 percent) on the basis that they had been
attenuated by other cases. A precedent is attenuated when the foundation on which it was
decided is substantially eroded or undermined by subsequent judgments of the Supreme
Court. For example, in Vetrovec v. The Queen, the Justices refused to follow a decision of the
House of Lords governing the corroboration of accomplice testimony, arguing that the

13 Ibid.. 349.
4 Robertson and Rosetanni v. The Queen, [1963] S.C.R. 651.
15 Christopher Manfredi, Judicial Power and the Charter: Canada and the Paradox of Liberal
Constitutionalism 2“ Edition (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2001), 54.
16 Ibid.
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decision had been “cast aside” by English courts and undermined by the two recent
judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada.17
The Court altered six precedents (9.8 percent) because the decisions proved to be
unworkable or created uncertainty for lower court judges. Perhaps the best example of a
decision being altered because it creates uncertainty is Minister o f Indian Affairs v. Ranville,
where the Court overruled its decision in Commonwealth o f Puerto Rico v. Hernandez. For
the majority, Justice Dickson stated that Hernandez should be overruled because, “in this
instance adherence to the stare decisis principle would generate more uncertainty than
certainty.18 After all, one of the traditional justifications for following a policy of stare
decisis is to promote legal certainty and predictability. Hence, a decision that creates
uncertainty undermines the purpose of stare decisis and should therefore be overruled.
In another case, Heredi v. Fensom, the Court unanimously overruled a series of
precedents pertaining to the meaning of the phrase “damages occasioned by a motor vehicle”
in the Saskatchewan Highway Traffic Act. The Justices maintained that the applicable
precedents were unclear and failed to provide adequate guidance to lower court judges.19 For
these reasons, the Court overruled the line of precedents.
The only case in which the Court altered a precedent because it had the effect of
expanding criminal liability is II v. Chaulk. At issue in Chaulk was the Criminal Code
definition of the term “wrong” as it applies to the defence of insanity.20 For the majority,
Lamer C. J. announced that the Court was prepared to overrule its decision in Schwartz v. The
Queen, which had previously governed the meaning of the term “wrong” in the context of the
insanity defence. In his opinion, Chief Justice Lamer referred to the factors outlined by

17 Vetrovec v. The Queen, [19821 1 S.C.R. 811
18 Min. of Indian Affairs v. Ranville, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 51&.
19 Heredi v. Fenson, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 741, par. 31 - 32.
20 R. v. Chaulk, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303.
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Dickson C .I, as he then was, in Bernard that would support a decision to overrule an earlier
judgment. According to Lamer C. J., “the fourth factor that was discussed by Dickson C. J.,
and that is directly relevant to the case at bar, is whether the prior judgment... is unfavourable
to an accused in that it expands the scope of criminal liability beyond acceptable limits.”21 In
the view of the majority, Schwartz had the effect of expanding criminal liability to include
persons who are incapable, because of a disease of the mind, of knowing that an act was
wrong.22 On that basis, the definition of “wrong” from Schwartz was overruled.
Having examined the characteristics of Supreme Court decisions that alter precedent,
the analysis now addresses the influence of stare decisis on the votes of the Justices in
precedent-altering decisions. The sample for this section was drawn from the list of altering
and altered precedents, and included only those Justices who participated in a precedentaltering decision as well as in the altered decision. Application of these criteria produced a
sample of twenty-five Justices who participated in 62 pairs of altering and altered decisions
since 1950.

21 Ibid., 1353.
22
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Table 4.5
Support for Institutional and Personal Stare Decisis by Justice

Justice
Taschereau
Locke
Abbott
Martland
Judson
Ritchie
Hall
Spence
Laskin
Dickson
Beetz
deGrandpre
Estey
McIntyre
Chouinard
Lamer
Wilson
L’HeureuxDube
Gonthier
Cory
McLachlin
Iacobucci
Major
Bastarache
Binnie
Total

# of Pairs of
Altered/Altering
Decisions
I
1
1
6
4
8
1
3
2
6
3
1
1
1
1
5
1
2

Pro-Legal
Model

ProPersonal
Stare
Decisis

1 (100%)
3 (50%)
2 (50%)
3 (37.5%)

1 (100%)
1 (100%)
5 (83.3%)
2 (50%)
4 (50%)

1 (33.3%)

1 (100%)

1 (16.7%)
2 (50%)
4 (50%)
1 (100%)
2 (66.7%)
4 (66.7%)
3 (100%)

1 (100%)
1 (100%)

1 (100%)

1 (100%)
2 (40%)

1 (100%)
3 (60%)
1 (100%)
2 (100%)
3 (100%)

3
2
4
2
1
1
1
62

1 (33.3%)
2 (100%)
2(33.3)

Compatible
with
Neither
I (100%)

2 (100%)
1 (25%)
1 (50%)
1 (100%)

3 (75%)
1 (50%)
1 (100%)

1 (100%)
12 (19.4%)

28 (45.2%)

34 (54.8%)

The data displayed in Table 4.5 show the number of pairs of altering and altered
decisions that each Justice has participated in, and the number votes compatible with the
legal model (institutional stare decisis), personal stare decisis, and neither. On an individual
basis, only six of the twenty-five Justices voted compatibly with the legal model version of
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stare decisis at a rate above 33 percent. Moreover, fourteen Justices voted compatibly with
personal stare decisis at a rate 34 percent or above. Thus, the data confirms the first major
hypothesis, which is that a majority of Justices exhibit a low level of support for the legal
model (33 percent or less), and moderate to high levels of support for personal stare decisis
(34 percent and above).
Considered collectively, the Justices voted compatibly with the legal model version
of stare decisis in 19.4 percent of the cases. In contrast, the Justices voted compatibly with
personal stare decisis in 45.2 percent of the cases, which is a moderate level of support. This
verifies the second major hypothesis that the Justices exhibit a low level of support (less than
33 percent) for the legal model version of stare decisis, and a moderate to high level of
support for institutional stare decisis.
Three Justices, Abbott, de Grandpre, and McIntyre supported the legal model version
of precedent at a rate of 100 percent. However, each participated in only one pair of cases. If
they are excluded, Justices Martland and Judson are the most supportive of the legal model,
followed by Ritchie. Justice Martland participated in six pairs of cases, and voted compatibly
with legal stare decisis in three pairs (50 percent). This means that Martland was opposed to
the alteration of precedent in 50 percent of the cases. Judson participated in six pairs of cases
and voted according to institutional stare decisis in three (50 percent). In his approximately
twenty-five year career as a Supreme Court Justice, Roland Ritchie took part in eight pairs of
cases, which is more than any other Justice, and conformed to the legal model in three (37.5
percent).
For example, in Brant Dairy Co. Ltd. v. Milk Commission o f Ontario et al.23,
Martland joined Abbott, Judson, and Ritchie in opposing the alteration of the Court’s

23 Brant Dairy Co. Ltd.. v. Milk Commissioner of Ontario, [1973] S.C.R. 131.
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precedent in Robbins et al. v. Ontario Flue-Cured Tobacco Growers ’Marketing Board24, an
administrative law case dealing with the power of the Milk Commission to delegate authority
to make regulations. Martland and Judson had been part of the majority in Robbins, thereby
making their votes in Brant Dairy consistent with both institutional and personal stare
decisis. In Bell v. The Queen25, a case concerning the reasonableness of a municipal zoning
by-law, Martland voted against altering the Court’s decision from six years earlier in City o f
Toronto v. Polai.26 Martland’s vote in Bell is also consistent with institutional and personal
stare decisis.
In Keizer v. Hanna27, Justices Judson and de Grandpre dissented from the alteration
of the Court’s decision in Gehrmann v. Lavoie. Both cases involved die awarding of damages
following fatal car accidents. The majority in Keizer held that the rule articulated in
Gehrmann governing the calculation of damages should be altered to account for the “impact
of income tax.”28 Based on the coding conventions, Judson and de Grandpre’s dissenting
votes in Keizer are considered consistent with institutional and personal stare decisis.
As seen in Table 4.6, the Justices’ votes conform to personal stare decisis in 45.2
percent of the pairs of cases, which is more than twice the number of votes that conform to
institutional precedent. The salience of judicial conformity to personal stare decisis in cases
that alter precedent lends support to the position that when rendering decisions, judges strive
to achieve consistency with their past judgments. From this perspective, judges act
strategically to maintain or enhance their reputation as consistent jurists. However, it is also
possible that when judges conform to personal stare decisis, it is because their decisions are

24 Robbins et al. v. Ontario Flue-Cured Tobacco Growers Marketing Board, [1965] S.C.R. 431.
Sell v. The Queen, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 212.
26 City of Toronto v. Polai, [1973] S.C.R. 38.
27 Keizer v. Hanna, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 342.
28 Ibid., 347.
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the result of a specific attitude toward the issue(s) raised in a particular case, rather than a
conscious attempt to be consistent.

Table 4.6
Frequency of the Justices’ Votes in Altered and Altering Decisions
Justice
Taschereau
Locke
Abbott
Martland
Judson
Ritchie
Hall
Spence
Laskin
Dickson
Beetz
de Grandpre
Estey
McIntyre
Chouinard
Lanier
Wilson
L’Heureux-Dubc
Gonthier
Cory
McLachlin
Iacobucci
Major
Bastarache
Binnie
Total

Majorityminority

Minoritymajority

Majoritymajority

Minorityminority

Total

1 (100%)

1
1
1
6
4
8
1
3
2
6
3
1
1
1
1
5
1
2
3
2
4
2
1
1
1

1 (100%)
1 (100%)
3 (50%)
2 (50%)
3 (37.5%)

2 (33.3%)
1 (12.5%)

1 (33.3%)
2 (100%)
2 (33.3%)

1 (16.7%)
2 (50%)
4 (50%)
1 (100%)
2 (66.7%)
4 (66.7%)
3 (100%)

1 (100%)
1 (100%)
1 (100%)
1 (100%)
3 (60%)
1 (100%)
2 (100%)
3 (100%)

2 (40%)

2 (100%)
1 (33.3%)
1 (50%)
1 (100%)

3 (66.7%)
1 (50%)
1 (100%)

1 (100%)
14 (22.6%)

14 (22.6%)

34 (54.8%)

0

62

Attention should also be given to the number of votes which do not conform to either
form of stare decisis. Specifically, over half of the Justices’ votes (54.8 percent) were
classified as consistent with neither institutional or personal stare decisis. This is further
illustrated by examining Table 4.6, which displays the patterns of the Justices’ membership
in majority and minority opinion coalitions in the altered and altering decisions. Interestingly,
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majority-majority voting (54.8 percent) predominates by 32.2 percent over majority-minority
and minority-majority voting (22.6 percent each). There is no example of a Justice being in
the minority in both the altered and altering decisions. The prevalence of majority-majority
voting is difficult to explain since it means that a Justice voted with the majority in the
precedent and in the altering decision.
One possible explanation for the prevalence of majority-majority voting patterns is
the power of institutional norms such as collegiality and unanimity. Justice Wilson maintains
that on a collegial tribunal such as the Supreme Court, the justices are obligated to “strive for
a consensus, or at least to submerge individuality in the interests of fewer sets of
reasons... .”29 Thus, as proponents of the strategic model expect, institutional norms which
stress collegiality and unanimity may lead some justices to join opinions that they do not
entirely agree with.
Alternatively, other strategic scholars hypothesize that majority-majority voting
patterns may be part of a long-term political strategy, whereby a justice supports the position
favoured by another justice, in exchange for the support of that justice in a subsequent case.
The final, and perhaps simplest explanation for majority-majority voting is that justices want
to be on the “winning” (majority) side, especially in important cases.
The results of the foregoing analysis indicate that the form of precedent associated
with the legal model of judicial behaviour has had a very limited influence on the votes of
Canadian Supreme Court Justices in cases that alter precedent. However, these findings are
limited to cases in which the Court alters precedent and cannot be generalized to include the
entire population of Supreme Court judgments. Moreover, the results are inherently biased
because the analysis focused specifically on precedent-altering decisions. Since the majority

29 Bertha Wilson. “Decision-Making in the Supreme Court,” University of Toronto Caw Journal 36 (1986):
236.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

86
of Justices voted in favour of altering precedent, support for the legal model is expected to be
low. For these reasons, additional research on the influence of precedent in regular cases is
required.
In order to assess the influence of precedent on the decisions of the Supreme Court of
Canada it was necessary to first compile a list of precedent-setting cases and their progeny.
This proved to be an extremely tedious task, as it required examining every volume of the
Supreme Court Reports from 1950 to the present, recording almost every dissenting vote, and
grouping precedent and progeny cases based on citation patterns and similarities among
cases. Construction of the list was aided by scholarly literature, however, considering the
paucity of data related to this subject, it offered minimal assistance.
The result is a list of 295 cases, comprised of 114 precedent-setting cases and 181
progeny cases. Moreover, the progeny cases produced a total of 291 votes which were
classified according to whether they are preferential (consistent with the judge’s revealed
preference) or precedential (conform to existing precedent). Progeny votes were further
classified into one of three categories representing strong, moderate, and weak levels of
expression. The list of precedent and progeny cases showing each Justice’s vote appears in
Table 4.7. It does not purport to be exhaustive; given the amount of information involved, it
is reasonable to expect that a few cases have been inadvertently missed. The progeny cases
have been indented, and are located directly below the precedents to which they correspond.
The Justices’ names are used to represent their votes in the progeny cases. They appear next
to the name of progeny case, in either the preference or precedent column.
To save space, the Justices’ names have been abbreviated as follows: Loc-Locke; EstJ.W. Estey; Cart-Cartwright; Ker-Kerwin; Ran-Rand; Fau-Fauteux; Tas-Taschereau; AbtAbbott; Sp-Spence; Hall-Hail; Jud-Judson; Rit-Ritchie; Pig-Pigeon; Las-Laskin; DckDickson; Gra-de Grandpre; Btz-Beetz; Lam-Lamer; Mcy-Mclntyre; Dain-Le Dain; Wil-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.

87
Wilson; For-La Forest; Est2-W.Z. Estey; Dube-L’Heureux-Dube; Sop-Sopinka; McLMcLachlin; Cor-Cory; Gon-Gonthier; Maj-Major; Bas-Bastarache; Arb-Arbour; Bin-Binnie;
LeB-LeBel; Des-Deschamps.
In addition, a bracketed number appears next to each vote indicating the level of
expression ((1) = strong pref/prec; (2) = moderate; (3) = weak). Finally, a single asterisk (*)
appears before the name of Justices who did not participate in the original precedent case, but
dissented in one of its progeny and relied on that dissent in subsequent cases. Two asterisks
(**) appear before the names of judges who, instead of dissenting in progeny cases, file
concurring opinions but which express disagreement on some point that led the judge to
dissent in the precedent decision.
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Table 4.7
Votes in Precedent and Progenv Va&
Precedent/Progeny______________________________________ Preference

Precedent

Min. of Nat. Revenue v. T.E. McCool Ltd. [1950]
Joggins Coal Co. Ltd. v. Min. of Nat. Revenue [1950]

Loc(3)

C.P.R. Co. v. A.G. Sask. [1951]
C.P.R. Co. v. City of Winnipeg [1952]

Est(1)

The King v. The Assessors of the Town of Sunny Brae [1952]
Comp. Auth. & Pub. Assoc, of Can. v. Kiwanis Club [1953]

Ker(2)-Cart(2)

Wilder v. Min. of Nat. Revenue [1952]
Min. of Nat. Revenue v. Wain Town Gas & Oil Co. Ltd. [1952]

Ran(2)

Azoulay v. The Queen [1952]
Cathro v. The Queen [1956]

Ran(2j

Fau(2)

Marsh v. Kulchar [1952]
King v. Colonial Homes Ltd. et al. [1956]
Marsden Kooler Trans. Ltd et al. v. Pollock [1953]
Archibald et al. v. Nesting et al. [1953]

Cart(2)

Loc(1)

Brusch v. The Queen [1953]
Parkes v. The Queen [1956]

Cart(1)

Toronto Newspaper Guild v. Globe Printing Co. [1953]
Labour Relations Board v. Traders’ Service Ltd. [1958]

Cart(1)

Kelsey v. The Queen [1953]
Binet v. The Queen [1954]

Cart(3)

Regent Vending Machines Ltd. v. Alb. Vending Machines [1954]
Johnson v. A.G. Alberta [1954]
Ker(2)-Est(2)
DeWare v. The Queen [1954]
Ker(2)-Est(2)
Min. of Nat. Revenue v. Anaconda American Brass Ltd. [1954]
Wilson v. Min. of Nat. Revenue [1955]
Est(3)
Min. of Nat. Revenue v. Trans Can. Investment Co. Ltd. [1956] Est(3)
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Table 4.7
Continued
Precedent/Progeny

Preference

Precedent

C.P.R. & Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Turta at al. [1954]
Prudential Trust Co. Ltd. v. Registrar, Humboldt [1957]

Loc(2)-Cart(2)

Eli Lilly & Co. Ltd. v. Min. of Nat. Revenue [1955]
Canadian General Electric Co. v. Min. of Nat. Revenue [1962]

Loc(2)

Boucher v. The Queen [1955]
Provencher v. The Queen [1956]

Tas(2)-Abt(2)

Stevenson v. Reliance Petroleum Ltd. [1956]
Irving Oil Co. Ltd. v. Can. General Insurance Co. [1958]

Loc(3)

Prudential Trust Co. Ltd. v. Cugnet [1956]
Prudential Trust Co. Ltd. v. Olsen [1960]

Cart(2)

Bradley v. The Queen [1956]
The Queen v. Cote [1964]
Silvestro v. The Queen [1965]
The Queen v. Lemire [1965]
Wild v. The Queen [1971]
The Queen v. Bagshaw [1972]
The Queen v. Paul [1977]

Cart(3)
Cart(3)
Cart(3)-*Sp(3)
Cart(2)-*Hall(2)-*Sp(2)
*Sp(1)
*Sp(2)

City of Westmount v. Montreal Trans. Comm. [1958]
City of Outremont v. Montreal Trans. Comm. [1958]

Ran(1)-Cart(1)

Goldhar v. The Queen [1960]
Goldhar v. The Queen [1960]
In Re Darby [1964]

Cartel)

Frobisher v. Canadian Pipelines & Petroleums Ltd. [1960]
City of Halifax v. Vaughan Construction Co. Ltd. [1961]

Loc(1)

Cart(1)

O’Grady v. Sparling [1960]
Mann v. The Queen [1966]
M clverv. The Queen [1966]

Cartel)
Cart(1)

Irrigation Industries Ltd. v. Min. of Nat. Revenue [1962]
Montreal Trust Co. v. Min. of Nat. Revenue [1962]

Jud(3)

Robertson & Rosetanni v. The Queen [1963]
The Queen v. Drybones [1970]

Cartel)
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Table 4.7
Continued
Precedent/Progeny

Preference

Koury v. The Queen [1964]
Guimond v. The Queen [1979]

Precedent

Rit(2)

Roumieu v. Osborne [1965]
Corrie v. Gilbert [1965]

Jud(1)

Re Martin; MacGregarv. Ryan [1965]
National Trust Co. Ltd. v. Fleury et al. [1965]

Jud(2)

The Queen v. Devereux [1965]
The Queen v. George [1966]
Daniels v. White & The Queen [1968]

Cart(3)
Cart(1)

Gordon v. The Queen [1965]
Poole v. The Queen [1967]
Klippert v. The Queen [1967]
Bingham v. The Queen [1971]

Cart(3)
Cart(3)
Mud (2)

Sterling Trust Co. v. Postma et al. [1965]
Vana v. Tosta et al. [1968]

Jud(3)-Rit(3)

Winnipeg Supply & Fuel Co. Ltd. v. Winnipeg [1966]
King Edward Properties Ltd. v. Winnipeg [1967]
University of Toronto v. Zeta Psi Elders Assoc. [1969]

Jud(3)
Jud(1)

Mapa et al. v. Township of North York et al. [1967]
Ample Investments Ltd. v. Township of North York [1967]Mart(1)
Tashan Ltd. v. Township of North York et al. [1967]
Mart(1)
Hadden v. The Queen [1968]
Poole v. The Queen [1968]
Mendick v. The Queen [1969]
Hatchwell v. The Queen [1976]

Fau(2)-Abt(2)-Mart(2)-Rit(2)
Fau(1 )-Abt(1)-Mart(1)-Rit(1)
Mart(1)-Rit(1)

Paton v. The Queen [1968]
Sanders v. The Queen [1970]

Cart(2)-Hall(2)-Sp(2)-Pig(2)

De Clercq v. The Queen [1968]
R v. Gauthier [1977]

Sp(3)

Sunbeam Co. Ltd. v. The Queen [1969]
Lampard v. The Queen [1969]
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Table 4.7
Continued
Precedent/Progeny

Preference

Precedent

Vinnal v. The Queen [1970]
Alexandroff v. The Queen [1970]
Levesque v. Comeau et al. [1970]
The Queen v. Lupien [1970]
Perrault v. The Queen [1971]

Mart(3)-Rit(3)
Mart(3)-Rit(3)
Rit(2)
*Sp(2)

Rit(2)

The Queen v. Wray [1971]
John v. The Queen [1971]

Hall(2)-Sp(2)

The Queen v. Nord-Deutsche et al. [1971]
The Ship Arthur Stove v. Stoneffax et al. [1971]

Pig(3)

Piche v. The Queen [1971]
Powell v. The Queen [1977]
Erven v. The Queen [1979]

Rit(1)-Mart(2)-Pig(2)

Judson v. Governors of the University of Toronto [1972]
Kalinin v. Metro Toronto [1972]
Metro Toronto v. Loblaw Co. Ltd [1972]

Jud(2)
Jud(3)

Jud(2)

Brownridge v. The Queen [1972]
Taraschuk v. The Queen [1977]
Chromiak v. The Queen [1980]
Arthurs v. The Queen [1974]
Harrison v. The Queen [1975]
Adgey v. The Queen [1975]
Caccamo v. The Queen [1976]

Jud(2)

Pig(2)
Las(3)-Sp(3)
Las(3)-Sp(3)
Las(3)-Sp(3)

Ross v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles for Quebec [1975]
Bell v. A.G. P.E.I. [1975]

Jud(3)-Sp(3)

Kienapple v. The Queen [1975]
Dore v. A.G. Canada [1975]
Sheppe v. The Queen [1980]

Rit(1)-Mart(1)
Rit(2)-Mart(2)

The Queen v. Burnshire [1975]
A.G. Canada v. Canard [1976]

Las(2)-Sp(2)
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Table 4.7
Continued
Precedent/Progeny____________________________ Preference_________Precedent
Hogan v. The Queen [1975]
Rilling v. The Queen [1976]
Jumaga v. The Queen [1977]
The Queen v. Hamm [1977]

Las(2)-Sp(2)
Las(2)-Sp(2)-*Dck(2)
Las(2)-Sp(2)-*Dck(2)

Puerto Rico v. Hernandez [1975]
Vardy v. Scott [1977]

Las(2)-Sp(2)

Ross Southward Tire v. Pyrotech Products [1976]
Agnew-Surpass v. Cummer-Yonge [1976]
T. Eaton Company v. Smith et al. [1978]
Greenwood Shopping Plaza v. Beattie [1980]

Gra(2)
Gra(2)

Jud(2)

Btz(2)
Btz(2)

Ref. Re Anti-Inflation Act [1976]
Man. Gov’t Employees Assoc, v. Manitoba [1978]

Btz(3)-Gra(3)

Faber v. The Queen [1976]
The Queen v. Hauser [1979]

Pig(2)-Sp(2)-Btz(2)

Schwartz v. The Queen [1977]
Cooper v. The Queen [1980]
Kjeldsen v. The Queen [1981]
R v . Abbey [1982]

Las(2)-Dck(2)-Btz(2)
*Mart(2)-Las(2)-Dck(2)-Btz(2)
*Mart(2)-Las(2)-Dck(2)-Btz(2)

Hill v. The Queen [1977]
R v. Gardiner [1982]

Las(1)

Mulligan v. The Queen [1977]
Leary v. The Queen [1978]
Young v. The Queen [1981]
R v. Quin [1988]
R v. Bernard [1988]

Las(2)-Sp(2)-Dck(2)
Las(3)-Dck(3)
Dck(1)
Dck(1)-*Lam(1)

Dck(2)

Capital Cities Communications Inc. v. C.R.T.C. [1978]
Public Service Board v. Dionne [1978]
Pig(1)-Btz(2)-Gra(2)
Rosen v. The Queen [1980]
Goldman v. The Queen [1980]

Las(1)
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Table 4.7
Continued
Precedent/Progeny________________________________ Preference

Precedent

Pappajohn v. The Queen [1980]
Sansregret v. The Queen [1985]

Dck(2)-Est2(2)

Four B. Man. Ltd. v. United Garment Workers et al. [1980]
The Queen v. Sutherland [1980]

Rit(2)

Rothman v. The Queen [1981]
Amato v. The Queen [1982]

Las(2)-Est2(2)

Ford v. The Queen [1982]
The Queen v. Toews [1985]

Dck(2)

R v. Therens [1985]
Trask v. The Queen [1985]
Rahn v. The Queen [1985]
R v. Thomsen [1988]

Mcy(2)-Dain(2)
Mcy(2)-Dain(2)
Mcy(2)-Dain(2)

Dubois v. The Queen [1985]
R v. Mannion [1986]

Mcy(1)

Bilodeau v. A.G. Manitoba [1986]
Macdonald v. City of Montreal [1986]

Wil(3)

Mills v. The Queen [1986]
Carter v. The Queen [1986
R v. Kalan [1989]

**Wil(3)
Lam(2)-Wil(2)

Mezzo v. The Queen [1986]
R v. Monteleone [1987]
R v. Jacobs [1988]
R v . Hare [1989]

Dck(3)-Lam(3)

Lam(2)-For(2)
Lam(1)
Lam(1)-For(2)
Lam(2)

R v. H all [1989]

R v. Collins [1987]
R v. Sieben [1987]

**Mcy(3)

R v. H am ill [1987]

**M cy(3)

R v. Pohoretsky [1987]
R v. Manninen [1987]
R v. Dairy Supplies Ltd. [1988]

Mcy(3)
Mcy(3)
Mcy(3)

Table 4.7
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Continued
Precedent/Progeny__________________________________ Preference
Ref. Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alb.) [1987]
P.S.A.C. v. Canada [1987]
Dck(1)-Wil(1)
R.W.D.S.U. v. Saskatchewan [1987]
Wil(2)
United States v. Allard [1987]
Lam(1)

Precedent

Dck(3)

R v. Wigglesworth [1987]
Burnham v. Metro Toronto Police [1987]
Trumbley & Pugh v. Metro Toronto Police [1987]
Trimm v. Durham Regional Police [1987]

Est2(2)
Est2(2)
Est2(2)

R v. Vaillancourt [1987]
R v. Laviolette [1987]

Mcy(1)

R v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd. [1988]
R v. Hydro-Quebec [1997]

Lam(1)

R v. Vermette [1988]
R v. Kearney [1992]

Lam(1)

Lac Minerals Ltd. v. Int. Nat. Corona Resources Ltd. [1989]
Hodgkinson v. Simms [1994]
Sop(1)
Soulos Korkontzilas [1997]
Sop(1)
Alberta Government Telephones v. C.R.T.C. [1989]
Ibew v. Alberta Government Telephones [1989]
Nelles v. Ontario [1989]
Proulx v. A.G. Quebec [2001]
United States v. Cotroni [1989]
McVey v. United States [1992]
United States v. Doyer [1993]

Wil(2)

Dube(1)

Sop(1)
Sop(3)

R v. M, (S.H.) [1989]
R v. L. (J.E.) [1989]

For(1)-Dube(1)

Just v. British Columbia [1989]
Hollis v. Dow Coming Corp. [1995]

Sop(1)

Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada [1990]
Stelco Inc. v. A.G. Canada [1990]

Wil(1)-Sop(1)

Ref. Re Ss. 193 & 195.1 (1)(c) of the Criminal Code [1990]
R v. Stagnitta [1990]
Wil(2)-Dube(2)
R v. Skinner [1990]
Wil(2)-Dube(2)
R v. McDonnell [1997]
Dube(2)
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Table 4,7
Continued
Precedent/Progeny

Preference

R v. Martineau [1990]
R v. Rodney [1990]
R v . J. (J.T.) [1990]
R v. Lachance [1990]
R v. Durette [1994]

Dube(1)
Dube(1)
Dube(1)-McL(1)
Dube(2)-McL(2)

McKinney v. University of Guelph [1990]
Harrison v. University of British Columbia [1990]
Stoffman v. Vancouver General Hospital [1990]
R v. Andrews [1990]
Canada (Human Rights Comm.) v. Taylor [1990]

Wil(1)-Dube(1)
Wil(1)-Dube(1)
For(1)-Sop(1)-McL(1)
For(1 )-Sop(1 )-McL(1)

R v. Chaulk [1990]
R v . Ratti [1991]

Precedent

Sop(2)

Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice) [1991]
Ref. Re Ng Extradition [1991]

Lam(1 )-Sop(1 )-Cor(1)

C.B.C. v. Lessard [1991]
C.B.C. v. New Brunswick (A.G.) [1991]

McL(1)

R v . W. (D.) [1991]
R v. Haroun [1997]

Sop(1)

R v. Seaboyer [1991]
R v. Osolin [1993]
R v. Esau [1997]

Dube(1)-Gon(1)
Dubd(1)-*McL(2)

R v . Goltz [1991]
R v. Brown [1994]

McL(2)

R v. Genereux [1992]
R v. Forster [1992]

Dube(1)

R v. Morin [1992]
R v. Sharma [1992]

Lam(1)

R v . Kelly [1992]
R v. Arnold [1992]

Sop(1)
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Precedent/Progeny

Preference

Symes v. Canada [1993]
Egan v. Canada [1995]
Thibaudeau v. Canada [1995]

Dube(2)-McL(2)
Dube(2)-McL(2)

R v. Bartle [1994]
R v. Prosper [1994]
R v. Pozniak [1994]
R v. Feeney [1997]

Dube(2)-Gon(2)
Dube(2)-Gon(2)
Dube(2)-Gon(2)

R v. Heywood [1994]
R v. Dunn [1995]
R v. St. Pierre [1995]
R v. Bunn [2000]

Dube(1)
Dube(1)
Dube(2)

R v. Power [1994]
R v. Jacques [1996]

Sop(1)-Maj(2)

R v. P. (M.B.) [1994]
R V. G. (S.G.) [1997]

Dube(1)-McL(1)

C.B.C. v. Canada (Labour Relations Board) [1995]
Royal Oak Mines Ltd. v. Canada [1996]

McL(2)

R v. Silveira [1995]
R v . Goldhart [1996]

For(1)

Precedent

R v. O’Connor [1995]
R v. Wickstaed [1997]

Sop(2)

R v. Robinson [1996]
R v. McMaster [1996]
R v. Lemky [1996]

Dube(2)
Dube(2)

R v. Van der Peet [1996]
R v. N.T.C. Smokehouse Ltd. [1996]

Dube(1)-McL(1)

Adler v. Ontario [1996]
Lavoie v. Canada [2002]

McL(2)-Dube(2)

R v. Stillman [1997]
R v . Golden [2001]

Dube(1 )-Gon(2)-McL(2)
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Precedent/Progeny

Preference

Winnipeg Child & Family Services v. G. (D.F.) [1997]
Dobson v. Dobson [1999]

Maj(1)

Continental Bank Leasing Corp. v. Canada [1998]
Continental Bank of Canada v. Canada [1998]
R v. Thomas [1998]
R v. Warsing [1998]

Precedent

Dube(1)-Bas(1)

Dube(1 )-Gon(1 )-McL(1)

Aboucharv. Ottawa French Language School Board [1999]
Deschamps v. Separate School Board (Prescott-Russell) [1999] Maj(1)
Garland v. Consumers’ Gas Co. [1998]
Trans. N. Am. Express Co. v. New Solutions Financial [2004]

Bas(2)

R v. Brooks [2000]
R v. Charlebois [2000]
R v. Cinous [2002]

Arb(1)
Arb(1)

R v. D.D. [2000]
R v. Parrott [2001]

Dube(2)-Gon(2)

Town of Ajax v. C.A.W., Local 222 [2000]
City of Sept-lles v. Quebec (Labour Court) [2001]

Bas(1)

R v. Oickle [2000]
R v. Tessier [2002]
R v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd. [2001]
C.U.P.E. v. Ontario (Minister of Labour) [2003]

Arb(2)

McL(1 )-Maj(1 )-Bas(1)

Housen v. Nikolaisen [2002]
Hartshorne v. Hartshorne [2004]
Bin(2)-LeB(2)
Jehova Witness Con. St. Jerome-Lafontaine v. Lafontaine [2004] Bin(2)-LeB(2)
R v. M alm o-Le vine [2003]
R v. Clay [2003]

Arb(1 )-LeB(1 )-Des(1)
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Tables 4.8 - 4.12 summarize the total number of preferential and precedential votes
for each Justice. There are seven Justices per table and five tables for a total of thirty-five
Justices. The Justices were grouped together chronologically according to the order in which
they appear in Table 4.7. The ensuing discussion will identify the significant findings and
highlight some of the more noteworthy examples of preferential and precedential voting.
Table 4.8
Preferential and Precedential Votes by Justice
Preferences (%)
Justice
Locke
J. W. Estey
Cartwright
Martland
Kerwin
Rand
Fauteux
Totals

Pref.
1
4
13
8
2
1
3

Prec.
5
1
9
4
1
2
0

% Pref.
16.67
80
59.1
66.7
66.7
33.3
100

32

22

59.3

Strong
(1)
1(100)
4(30.8)
4(50)
1(100)
1(33.3)

Moderate
(2)

Weak
(3)

2(50)
2(15.4)
2(25)
2(100)

2(50)
7(53.8)
2(25)

Precedent (%)
Strong Moderate Weak
(1)
(2)
2(40)
1(20)
1(100)
5(55.6) 4(44.4)
3(75)
1(25)
1(100)
2(100)

(3)
2(40)

2(66.7)

11(34.4) 10(31.2) 11(34.4) 8(36.4) 12(54.5) 2(9.1)

Table 4.8 presents the total number of preferential and precedential votes for Justices
Locke, Estey, Cartwright, Martland, Kerwin, Rand, and Fauteux. Combined, these Justices
voted according to their preferences in 59.3 percent of the progeny cases. Conversely, 40.7
percent of the progeny votes are attributed to the influence of precedent. Justice Locke had
the highest percentage of precedential votes, 83.3 percent versus 16.7 percent preferential.
Locke J. changed his vote in five progeny, meaning that he acceded to the position from
which he dissented in the precedent case. Justice Locke’s only preferential vote came in
Archibald et al. v. Nesting et al,30, in which he dissented based on his earlier dissent from
Marsden Kooler Trans. Ltd. et al. v. Pollock,31 Under the coding conventions used by Segal

30 Marsden Kooler Trans. Ltd. et al. v. Pollock, [1953] 1 S.C.R. 66.
31 Archibald et al. v. Nesting et al., [1953] 2 S.C.R. 423.
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and Spaeth, Locke’s vote in Archibald is classified as “strong preferential” since he referred
to his dissent in the precedent case.
Justice Cartwright’s votes in Mann v. The Queen32 andMclver v. The Queen33
provide excellent examples of “strong precedential” behaviour. The decisions in Mann and
Mclver relied on the Court’s judgment in O ’Grady v. Sparling, a case dealing with the
validity of provincial careless driving laws.34 Although Cartwright dissented in O ’Grady, he
authored concurring opinions in both of its progeny which explicitly follow the majority
opinion from O ’Grady. For this reason, Cartwright’s progeny votes were coded as “strong
precedential.”
Table 4.9
Preferential and Precedential Votes by Justice
Preferences (%)
Justice
Taschereau
Abbott
Spence
Hall
Judson
Ritchie
Pigeon
Totals

Pref.
0
2
17
3
9
8
4

Prec.
1
1
3
0
5
5
2

% Pref.
0
66.7
85
100
64.3
61.5
66.7

43

17

71.7

Precedent (%)

Strong
(1)

Moderate
(2)

1(50)
1(5.9)
2(22.2)
3(37.5)
1(25)

1(50)
11(64.7)
3(100)
3(33.3)
2(25)
2(50)

8(18.6)

22(51.2) 13(30.2) 2(11.8) 13(76.4) 2(11.8)

Weak
(3)

5(29.4)
4(44.5)
3(37.5)
1(25)

Strong Moderate Weak
(3)
(1)
(2)
1(100)
1(100)
2(66.7) 1(33.3)
1(20)
1(20)

3(60)
4(80)
2(100)

The seven Justices presented in Table 4.9 voted consistently with their original
revealed preference in 71.7 percent of the progeny cases, and acceded to the position
established by precedent in the remaining 28.3 percent. To illustrate weak preferential voting,
consider Justice Ritchie’s decisions in the progeny of Vinnal v. The Queen/ 5 Specifically,
Ritchie participated in four negligence cases that either relied on, or raised similar issues to
32 Mann v. The Queen, [1966] S.C.R. 238.
33 Mclver v. The Queen, [1966] S.C.R. 254.
34 O’Grady v. Sparling, [1960] S.C.R. 804.
35 Vinnal v. The Queen, [1970] S.C.R. 502.
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1(20)

100
those in V i n n a l Although Ritchie J. did not cite his dissent from Vinnal, his votes in the
first two progeny cases are consistent with the ideological direction of his vote in Vinnal, and
are therefore coded as weak preferential.
Perhaps the best example of strong precedential behaviour is the concurring opinion
of Justice Judson, which was joined by Spence J., in Lampard v. The Queen.37Lampard is a
progeny case of Sunbeam Co. Ltd. v. The Queen which was decided in the same year.38
Justices Judson and Spence dissented in Sunbeam, only to accept it as a binding precedent
shortly thereafter. In Lampard, Judson J. unequivocally stated that the doctrine of stare
decisis “compelled” him to follow the majority opinion from Sunbeam 39 Although there are
other examples of strong precedential voting, the concurrence of Judson J. and Spence J. in
Lampard is the only case where the Justices openly attribute the decision to vote against their
original revealed preference to the influence of precedent.
Table 4.10
Preferential and Precedential Votes by Justice
Precedent (%)

Preferences (%)
Justice

Pref.
13
Laskin
7
Dickson
3
de Grandpre
1
Beetz
6
Lamer
McIntyre
2
0
Le Dain
Totals

32

Prec.
3
8
1
7
6
8
3

% Pref.
81.3
46.7
75
14.3
50
20
0

36

47.1

Strong Moderate Weak
(1)
(2)
(3)
2(15.4)
7(53.8) 4(30.8)
3(42.9) 3(42.9) 1(14.2)
3(100)
1(100)
5(83.3)
1(16.7)
2(100)

Strong Moderate Weak
(2)
(3)
(1)
3(100)
6(75)
2(25)
1(100)
6(85.7) 1(14.3)
3(50) 2(33.3) 1(16.7)
2(25) 3(37.5) 3(37.5)
3(100)

10(31.2) 15(46.9)

5(13.9) 23(63.9) 8(22.2)

7(21.9)

36 The Queen v. Lupien, [1970] S.C.R. 263; Alexandra®v. The Queen, [1970] S.C.R. 753; Levesque v.
Comeau et al., [1970] S.C.R. 1010; Perrault v. The Queen, [1971] S.C.R. 196.
37 Lampard v. The Queen, [1969] S.C.R. 373. [hereinafter, Lampard]
38 Sunbeam Co. Ltd. v. The Queen, [1969] S.C.R. 221.
39 Lampard, 382.
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The Justices featured in Table 4.10 are the only group that combined to produce more
precedential than preferential votes. This group of Justices voted consistently with existing
precedent in 52.9 percent of the progeny cases, while 47.1 percent of the votes conform to
preferential voting. Justice Bora Laskin, who served on the Court for nearly fourteen years,
eleven of which were as Chief Justice, had the highest proportion of preferential votes with
81.3 percent. This is to be expected given Laskin’s reputation as a fiercely independent
Justice who was often in dissent, especially in criminal law cases.40 Justice Laskin’s votes in
the three progeny cases of Hogan v. The Queen are illustrative of this point.41 Hogan
involved the right of individuals to retain counsel before submitting to a breathalyser. Laskin
dissented in the three Hogan progeny cases, citing his original dissent in each.42
Justices Beetz and McIntyre stand out as having the largest proportion of precedential
votes compared to the other Justices in Table 4.10. Justice Beetz voted according to
precedent in 85.7 percent of the progeny cases, while McIntyre followed stare decisis in 80
percent. In Ross Southward Tire v. Pyrotech Products, Justice Beetz dissented from the
majority regarding the apportionment of liability following an accidental fire.43 The majority
held that, under the terms of the insurance policy, the landlord could recover damages for a
fire caused by the tenant.44 Justices Beetz and de Grandpre dissented, arguing that the
insurance policy did not cover the fire, and that the landlord should seek damages from the
tenant.45 However, Beetz accepted the majority judgment from Ross two years later in T.

40 See generally, J. Edwards, “Bora Laskin and the Criminal Law,” University of Toronto Taw Journal 35
(1985): 325 - 352; Peter McCormick, “Follow the Leader: Judicial Power and Judicial Leadership on the
Laskin Court, 1973 - 1984,” Queen’s Law Journal 24 (1998): 237 - 277.
41 Hogan v. The Queen, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 574.
42 Rilling v. The Queen, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 183; Jumaga v. The Queen, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 486; The Queen v.
Hamm, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 85.
43 Ross Southward Tire v. Pyrotech Products, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 35.
44 Ibid.
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Eaton Company v. Smith et a l46, and again two years after that, in Greenwood Shopping
Plaza v. Beattie 47
Justice McIntyre’s votes in the progeny of R. v. Collins are prime examples of weak
precedential behaviour. At issue in Collins was the admissibility of evidence under sections
24 (1) and (2) of the Charter. Justice McIntyre dissented in Collins, arguing that although the
search was unreasonable, the evidence should be admitted since its admission would not
bring the “administration of justice into disrepute.”48 However, in three subsequent decisions
based on Collins, McIntyre’s votes were consistent with the ideological direction of the
majority opinion in Collins 49 Hence, Justice McIntyre’s votes in the Collins progeny are
coded as weak precedential.

Table 4.11
Preferential and Precedential Votes by Justice
Preferences (%)
Justice
Wilson
La Forest
W. Z. Estey
L’HeureuxDube
Sopinka
McLachlin
Cory
Totals

Strong
(D
4(40)
4(100)

Moderate

Pref.
10
4
1

Prec.
1
2
4

% Pref.
91
66.7
20

28
11
15
1

3
3
1
0

90.3
78.6
93.8
100

16(57.1) 12(42.9)
11(100)
8(53.3) 7(46.7)
1(100)

70

14

83.3

44(62.9) 24(34.3)

(2)

4(40)

Weak
(3)
2(20)

1(100)

Precedent (%)
Strong Moderate Weak
(3)
(1)
(2)
1(100)
2(100)
4(100)
1(33.3) 2(66.7)
2(66.7)
1(100)

2(2.8)

1(7.1)

12(85.8)

1(33.3)

1(7.1)

46 T. Eaton Company v. Smith et al., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 749.
47 Greenwood Shopping Plaza v. Beattie, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 228.
48 R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265. Also see Justice McIntyre’s dissent in R. v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R.
613.
49 R. v. Pohoretsky, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 945; R. v. Manninen, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1233; R. v. Dairy Supplies Ltd.,
[1988] 1 S.C.R. 665.
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The Justices in Table 4.11 combined to produce the second highest percentage of
preferential votes, at 83.3 percent. The Justices conform to precedent in only 16.7 percent of
the cases. Justice W. Estey is the only member of the group that appears to have been
substantially influenced by precedent. Conversely, Justices Wilson, L’Heureux-Dube, and
McLachlin rarely vote according to precedent. Although the data suggests that precedent has
a very limited degree of influence on the votes of these Justices, an examination of their
individual voting patterns reveals that they are among the most consistent members of the
Court in terms of conforming to their past positions.
For example, consider the most frequent preferential voter, Justice L’Heureux-Dube.
The results reported here support the findings of previous research, discussed in Chapter
Two, that she consistently supports the position of equality rights claimants and opposes the
position of criminal rights claimants.50 In her dissenting opinion from R. v. Martineau,
L’Heureux-Dube J. voted to uphold the constructive murder provisions of the criminal code
whereas the majority ruled that the provisions violated Section 7 of the Charter.51 She
continued to oppose similar criminal rights claims in four progeny cases, citing her dissenting
opinion from Martineau in each.52 Moreover, Justice L’Heureux-Dube’s propensity to
support equality rights claimants is evident in the progeny cases of Symes v. Canada,53
Overall, the results here regarding the ideological direction of Justice L’Heureux-Dube’s
votes in progeny decisions demonstrate her attachment to preferential voting particularly in
criminal rights and equality rights cases.

50 See James B. Kelly, “The Charter of Rights and the Rebalancing of Liberal Constitutionalism in Canada.
1982-1997,” Osgood Hall Law Journal 37, no. 3 (1999): 680.
51 R. v. Martineau, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633.
52 R. v. Rodney, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 687; R. v. J. (J.T.), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 755; R. v. Lachance, [1990] 3 S.C.R.
3; R. v. Durette, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 469.
53 Symes v. Canada, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695. The progeny cases are Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513; and
Thibaudeau v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627.
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Table 4.12
Preferential and Precedential Votes by Justice
Precedent (%)

Preferences (%)
Justice
Gonthier
Major
Bastarache
Arbour
Binnie
LeBel
Deschamps
Totals

Pref.
7
4
3
3
2
3
1

Prec.
0
0
1
1
0
0
0

23

2

% Pref.
100
100
75
75
100
100
100
92

Strong Moderate
(1)
(2)
2(28.6) 5(71.4)
3(75)
1(25)
2(66.7)
1(33.3)
3(100)
2(100)
1(33.3) 2(66.7)
1(100)
12(52.2) 11(47.8)

Weak

(3)

Strong Moderate Weak

(1)

(2)

1(100)
1(100)

1(50)

1(50)

Although the number of progeny votes in Table 4.132 is substantially smaller than in
Tables 4.8 - 4.11, the data fit into a pattern of increased preferential voting, particularly by
the more recent Justices. Because they are relatively new to the Court, Justices LeBel and
Deschamps have not participated in enough cases to make any conclusions as to whether they
are influenced by precedent in their decision-making. However, if the past behaviour of other
Justices is any indicator, it is reasonable to expect that considerations of stare decisis will
have a minimal influence on their votes.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

(3)

105

Table 4.13
Combined List of Preferential and Precedential Votes by Justice

Strong
Justice
Locke

Pref.
1
4
J. W. Estey
13
Cartwright
Martland
8
2
Kerwin
Rand
1
Fauteux
3
Taschereau
0
Abbott
2
Spence
17
Hall
3
Judson
9
Ritchie
8
4
Pigeon
Laskin
13
7
Dickson
3
de Grandpre
Beetz
1
Lamer
6
McIntyre
2
Le Dain
0
Wilson
10
4
La Forest
W. Z. Estey
1
L’HeureuxDube
28
Sopinka
11
McLachlin
15
Cory
1
Gonthier
7
Major
4
Bastarache
3
Arbour
3
Binnie
2
LeBel
3
1
Deschamps
Total

200

Prec.
5
1
9
4
1
2
0
1
1
3
0
5
5
2
3
8
1
7
6
8
3
1
2
4

% Pref.
16.67
80
59.1
66.7
66.7
33.3
100
0
66.7
85
100
64.3
61.5
66.7
81.3
46.7
75
14.3
50
20
0
91
66.7
20

(1)
1(100)
4(30.8)
4(50)
1(100)
1(33.3)
1(50)
1(5.9)
2(22.2)
3(37.5)
1(25)
2(15.4)
3(42.9)

5(83.3)

Preferences (%)
Moderate Weak
(2)
(3)
2(50)
2(15.4)
2(25)
2(100)

2(50)
7(53.8)
2(25)

(1)
1(20)
1(100)
5(55.6)
1(25)

Precedent (%)
Moderate Weak
(2)
(3)
2(40)
2(40)
4(44.4)
3(75)
1(100)
2(100)

2(66.7)
1(50)
11(64.7)
3(100)
3(33.3)
2(25)
2(50)
7(53.8)
3(42.9)
3(100)
1(100)
1(16.7)

4(40)

1(100)
1(100)
2(66.7)

5(29.4)
4(44.5)
3(37.5)
1(25)
4(30.8)
1(14.2)

2(100)
4(40)
4(100)

Strong

1(20)
1(20)

3(50)
2(25)

2(20)

1(100)

3
3
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0

90.3
78.6
93.8
100
100
100
75
75
100
100
100

16(57.1) 12(42.9)
11(100)
8(53.3)
7(46.7)
1(100)
2(28.6)
5(71.4)
3(75)
1(25)
2(66.7)
1(33.3)
3(100)
2(100)
1(33.3) 2(66.7)
1(100)

1(33.3)

91

68.7

85(29.2) 82(28.2) 33(11.3)

17(5.8)

3(60)
4(80)
2(100)
3(100)
6(75)
6(85.7)
2(33.3)
3(37.5)
3(100)
1(100)
2(100)
4(100)
2(66.7)
2(66.7)
1(100)

1(33.3)
1(20)

2(25)
1(100)
1(14.3)
1(16.7)
3(37.5)

1(33.3)

1(100)
1(100)
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Table 4.13 combines the data from Tables 4.8 - 4.12, and shows the total number of
preferential and precedential votes. Eighteen of the thirty-five Justices voted according to
their preferences in 68 percent or more of the progeny cases which corresponds to a high
level of preferential expression. This confirms the first hypothesis that a majority of Justices
exhibit strong levels of preferential behaviour. Although it is only a slight majority (51.2
percent), the data are sufficient to accept the hypothesis that most Justices on the Supreme
Court of Canada conform to their personal preferences more often than to precedents.
The Court’s overall support for precedent in progeny cases since 1950 stands at 31.3
percent, which is considered a weak level of influence. In contrast, 68.7 percent of the total
votes cast in progeny cases were consistent with the justices’ original revealed preference.
Together, the weak level of precedential voting and strong level of preferential voting
supports the expectation of the second hypothesis, which is that the decision-making of the
Court as a whole is influenced more by the personal preferences of the Justices than by the
doctrine of stare decisis.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
In summary, the findings of the research reported here do not bear out the
conventional wisdom that precedent has a substantial influence on the decisions of the
Justices on the Supreme Court of Canada. While the content analysis shows that the Justices
frequently use precedent and other variables associated with the legal model to justify their
decisions, additional research proves that precedent has a minimal influence on how the
Justices decide cases. In particular, an examination of precedent-altering judgments
demonstrates that, with the exception of a few Justices, stare decisis rarely influences the
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada. The same conclusion holds true for ordinary cases
where precedential influence was slightly greater than in precedent-altering decisions, but
still low enough to be classified as having a weak influence on the Justices’ decisions.
Accordingly, these results support the findings of American researchers that the attitudinal
model provides a better explanation of how judges decide cases.
Interestingly, when the results from studies 2 and 3 are combined, the Justices with
the highest rates of conformity to precedent were all appointed to the Supreme Court either
by Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, or P.E. Trudeau. Specifically, Justices Martland and
Judson were appointed by P.M. Diefenbaker in 1958, followed a year later by Justice Roland
Ritchie. As Prime Minister, Trudeau appointed Justices Dickson, Beetz, and McIntyre to the
Supreme Court between 1973 and 1979. Compared to the other members of the Court since
1950, these six Justices were the most supportive of the legal model version of stare decisis.
In addition, these Justices are united by the fact that they were all appointed before
the introduction of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982. Prior to the Charter era, the
Supreme Court of Canada was regarded as an extremely conservative institution in that the
Justices were reluctant to invalidate legislation or to disturb existing precedents. As the
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results of study 2 indicate, the number of precedent-altering decisions significantly increased
following the entrenchment of the Charter. This suggests that the Charter brought about a
change in how Supreme Court Justices view their role in society.
In the Charter era, the conservative conception of the judicial function has been
replaced by one which emphasizes the need for judicial creativity and a greater willingness to
pass judgment on the content of legislation. Thus, the relatively high rate of conformity to
precedent demonstrated by Justices Martland, Judson, Ritchie, Dickson, Beetz, and McIntyre,
may be, at least in part, a function of the conservative culture of Canadian law which
prevailed throughout most of their judicial careers. This explanation is further supported by
the declining rates of precedential influence among the Justices who were appointed after the
introduction of the Charter.
The results reported here imply that precedent has a weak influence on the decision
making of the majority of Justices on the Supreme Court of Canada. However, when
compared to the findings of American researchers, the data reveal that the Court as a whole
conforms to institutional stare decisis at a rate that is nearly three times higher than the U.S.
Supreme Court. For example, Segal and Spaeth found that since 1960, the Justices on the
U.S. Supreme Court switched their vote to the position from which they originally dissented
in 9.2 percent of the progeny cases.1Conversely, the Justices on the Supreme Court of
Canada conformed to precedent in 31.3 percent of the progeny cases. Thus, from a
comparative perspective, the Justices on the Supreme Court of Canada appear to be more
influenced by institutional stare decisis than their American counterparts.
While this analysis has assessed the influence of stare decisis on judicial decision
making, it has avoided making any normative claims regarding the desirability of adhering to

1 Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth, “The Influence of Stare Decisis on the Votes of United States Supreme
Court Justices,” American Journal of Political Science 40 (1996): 983.
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precedent. Rather than arguing that judges should or should not follow precedent, it is limited
exclusively to the question of influence. However, the growing incidence of preferential
voting has serious implications for the principle of predictability. In particular, judges must
ensure that they strike the proper balance between legal continuity and predictability, and the
need to update the law by altering established precedents. Consequently, its purpose has been
to test the conventional wisdom that precedent is the fundamental principle of judicial
decision-making.2 While the results do not support the conventional wisdom, neither do they
completely rule out the influence of precedent on judicial decision-making.
For this reason, additional research is needed into legal and attitudinal factors that
affect judicial decision-making in Canada This, in turn, requires broadening the study of law
beyond the traditional concern with legal rules to include an understanding of how
personalities and preferences shape judicial decisions. Only when the mythology of judging
is deconstructed and the barriers separating legal scholarship and the social sciences are
removed, will it be possible to truly know whether the Justices on the Supreme Court of
Canada take precedent seriously.

2 Ibid.. 971.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

110
APPENDIX A:
Cases included in the Content Analysis
Giguere v. Chambre des notaires du Quebec, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 3, 2004 SCC 1.
I.A.T.S.E., Stage Local 56 v. Societe de la Place des Arts de Montreal, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 43,
2004 SCC 2.
Crystalline Investments Ltd. v. Domgroup Ltd., [2004] 1 S.C.R 60, 2004 SCC 3.
Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004]
1 S.C.R. 76, 2004 SCC 4.
R. v. Lyttle, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 193, 2004 SCC 5.
R. v. Daoust, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 217, 2004 SCC 6.
Transport North American Express Inc. v. New Solutions Financial Corp., [2004] 1 S.C.R.
249, 2004 SCC 7.
9050-3400 Quebec Inc. v. Riverin, Girard & Associes Inc., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 301, 2004 SCC
8.

Hamilton v. Open Window Bakery Ltd., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 303, 2004 SCC 9.
Townsend v. Kroppmanns, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 315, 2004 SCC 10.
R. v. Kehler, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 328, 2004 SCC 11.
C.U. v. Alberta (Director of Child Welfare), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 336, 2004 SCC 12.
CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, 2004 SCC 13.
R. v. Smith, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 385, 2004 SCC 14.
Gifford v. Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 411, 2004 SCC 15.
R. v. Cheddesingh, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 433, 2004 SCC 16.
John Doe v. Bennett, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 436, 2004 SCC 17.
Foster Wheeler Power Co. v. Societe intermunicipale de gestion et d'elimination des dechets
(SIGED) inc., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 456, 2004 SCC 18.
United Taxi Drivers' Fellowship of Southern Alberta v. Calgary (City), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 485,
2004 SCC 19.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 498,
2004 SCC 20.
Pinet v. St. Thomas Psychiatric Hospital, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 528, 2004 SCC 21.
Hartshorne v. Hartshorne, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 550, 2004 SCC 22.
Voice Construction Ltd. v. Construction & General Workers' Union, Local 92, [2004] 1
S.C.R. 609, 2004 SCC 23.
R. v. Lohrer, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 627, 2004 SCC 24.
Garland v. Consumers' Gas Co., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 629, 2004 SCC 25.
Re. Cartaway Resources Corp., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 672, 2004 SCC 26.
R. v. Fontaine, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 702, 2004 SCC 27.
Alberta Union of Provincial Employees v. Lethbridge Community College, [2004] 1 S.C.R.
727, 2004 SCC 28.
Bank of Nova Scotia v. Thibault, [2004] 1 S.C.R 758, 2004 SCC 29.
Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Communaute
urbaine de Montreal, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 789, 2004 SCC 30.
Pritchard v. Ontario (Human Right Commission), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 809, 2004 SCC 31.
Nutribec Ltee v. Quebec (Commission d'appel en matiere de lesions professionnelles), [2004]
1 S.C.R. 824, 2004 SCC 32.
Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827, 2004 SCC 33.
Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, 2004 SCC 34.
Bibaud v. Quebec (Regie de l’assurance maladie), [2004] 2 S.C.R. 3, 2004 SCC 35.
Finney v. Barreau du Quebec, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 17, 2004 SCC 36.
Banque nationale de Paris (Canada) v. 165836 Canada Inc., [2004] 2 S.C.R. 45, 2004 SCC
37.
British Columbia v. Canadian Forest Products Ltd., [2004] 2 S.C.R. 74, 2004 SCC 38.
Quebec (Commission des droits de la pesonne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Quebec
(Attorney General), [2004] 2 S.C.R. 185, 2004 SCC 39.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

112
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Quebec (Human Rights Tribunal), [2004] 2 S.C.R. 223, 2004
SCC 40.
R. v. Remillard, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 246, 2004 SCC 41.
Application under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code (Re), [2004] 2 S.C.R. 248, 2004 SCC 42.
Re. Vancouver Sun, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332, 2004 SCC 43.
R. v. Kerr, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 371, 2004 SCC 44.
Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Assn. of
Internet Providers, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427, 2004 SCC 45.
R. v. Demers, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 489, 2004 SCC 46.
Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, 2004 SCC 47.
Congregation des temoins de Jehovah de St-Jerome-Lafontaine v. Lafontaine (Village),
[2004] 2 S.C.R. 650, 2004 SCC 48.
Anderson v. Amoco Canada Oil and Gas, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 3,2004 SCC 49.
R. v. Raponi, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 35, 2004 SCC 50.
Nova Scotia Power Inc. v. Canada, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 53, 2004 SCC 51.
R. v. Mann, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59, 2004 SCC 52.
Gilles E. Neron Communication Marketing Inc. v. Chambre des notaires du Quebec, [2004] 3
S.C.R. 95, 2004 SCC 53.
Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services), [2004] 3 S.C.R.
152, 2004 SCC 54.
Cabiakman v. Industrial Alliance Life Insurance Co., [2004] 3 S.C.R. 195, 2004 SCC 55.
R. v. Perrier, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 228, 2004 SCC 56.
R. v. Chan, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 245, 2004 SCC 57.
Cote v. Rancourt, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 248, 2004 SCC 58.
Epiciers Unis Metro-Richelieu Inc., division "Econogros" v. Collin, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 257,
2004 SCC 59.
Glykis v. Hydro-Quebec, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 285, 2004 SCC 60.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

113
Entreprises Sibecalnc. v. Frelighsburg (Municipality), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 304, 2004 SCC 61.
Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 323, 2004
SCC 62.
Lefebvre (Trustee of); Tremblay (Trustee of), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 326, 2004 SCC 63.
Ouellet (Trustee of), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 348, 2004 SCC 64.
Hodge v. Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 357, 2004
SCC 65.
Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. N.A.P.E., [2004] 3 S.C.R. 381, 2004 SCC 66.
R. v. Tessling, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, 2004 SCC 67.
Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461, 2004 SCC 68.
R. v. Blake, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 503, 2004 SCC 69.
R. v. Saunders, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 505, 2004 SCC 70.
R. v. Smith, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 507, 2004 SCC 71.
R. v. Zurowski, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 509, 2004 SCC 72.
Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, 2004 SCC 73.
Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), [2004] 3
S.C.R. 550, 2004 SCC 74.
Pacific Natioanl Investments Ltd. v. Victoria (City), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 575, 2004 SCC 75.
Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657,
2004 SCC 78.
Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, 2004 SCC 79.
R. v. Lohrer, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 732, 2004 SCC 80.
Martineau v. M.N.R., [2004] 3 S.C.R. 737, 2004 SCC 81.
UL Canada Inc. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 760, 2004 SCC 82.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

114

Appendix B:
Altered and Altering Decisions
|

Altering Decisions
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S.C.R. 614
Ares v. Vernier [1970]
S.C.R. 608, at 625.
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Commission o f Ontario
[1973] S.C.R. 131, at 152153
Paquette v. The Queen
[1977] 2 S.C.R. 189, at 197
McNamara Construction
Ltd. v. The Queen [1977] 2
S.C.R. 654, at 661
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S.C.R. 827
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Marketing A ct [1978] 2
S.C.R. 1198 at 1234, 1291
Keizer v. Hanna [1978] 2
S.C.R. 342, at 347
Bell v. The Queen [1979] 2
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Ranville 139 D.L.R. (3d) 1,
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D.L.R. (3d) 89, [1982] 1
S.C.R. 811, a t 830

Ref. Re. s. 94 (2) o f the B.C.
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S.C.R. 486
R. v. Big M Drug Mart
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at
333-334

Altered Decisions
Diggon-Hibben Ltd. v. The King
[1949] 4 D.L.R. 785, S.C.R. 712
The King v. Lavoie [1950] Sp.
Ct. unreported.
Myers v. Director o f Public
Prosecutions [1965] A.C. 1001.
Robbins et. al. v. Ontario FlueCured Tobacco Growers
Marketing Board [1965] S. C.R.
431
Dunbar v. The King [1936] 67
C.C.C. 20 (S.C.C.)
Farwellv. The Queen [1894] 22
S.C.R. 553
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S.C.R. 60
Paul v. The Queen [1960]
S.C.R. 452
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[1965] S.C.R. 359
R. v. MacDonald[1965] S.C.R.
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228
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Queen [1963] S.C.R. 651
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Overruled
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Unworkablecreates
uncertainty

Adopted the
minority opinion
Not Followed

Need to update
law
Attenuated

Overruled

Decision was
wrong
Decision was
wrong

Overruled

Not Followed

Attenuated

Overruled

Attenuated

Did not follow
majority opinion
Distinguished (“no
longer bound by...)

Decision was
wrong
Decision was
wrong

Adopted the
minority opinion
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law
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Not Followed

Altered the meaning
of “fundamental
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Altering the
meaning of
“freedom of
religion”

The Charter

The Charter
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Appendix B:
Continued
Altering Decisions
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